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The conflict between ethnic Albanians and Orthodox Christian Serbs in the
Serbian region of Kosovo provides the foundation for a Fourth Balkan War. Kosovo
was at the origin of the most recent Balkan conflict and may unravel peace efforts in
the future. Serbia revoked Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989 and has instituted a
campaign of repression that is currently unrivaled in Europe. The ethnic Albanian
majority in Kosovo comprises over ninety percent of the population and seeks
recognition as the independent Republic of Kosovo.
Initially, ethnic Albanians responded peacefully to Serb antagonism, but
impatience with the lack of progress has led to the use of terrorism to achieve political
aims. The recent emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) as the vehicle
for the armed opposition has provoked a series of violent Serb crackdowns. Ethnic
Albanian leaders of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo understand the need for
external support and are working to court the international community. Although
outside intervention is a sine qua non of a solution to the Kosovo problem, the
international community did not address the issue in the 1995 Dayton Accords.
This thesis examines the Albanian resistance movement and the emergence of
an underground government since the early 1980's. It traces the historical origins of
the conflict, explores the Serb obsession with the region, and attempts to evaluate the
present situation through an number of potential scenarios. Based on current
conditions, provincial ethnic violence could drive hundreds of thousands of refugees
from Kosovo into neighboring Balkan states. The resulting shift in regional
demography would most likely lead to the involvement of NATO and the United
States. Serb intransigence, ethnic Albanian frustration, and the absence of international
resolve to deal with Kosovo have resulted in a potentially dangerous situation that
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Serbia's revocation of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 rocked Yugoslavia and started
a chain of events that eventually lead to war in Bosnia and Croatia. Ethnic Albanians
represent the majority of the population in the southern Serb province of Kosovo, but are
currently restrained under the daunting force of Serb repression. This territory is the
heart of traditional Serbia and the Serbs' powerful religious attachment to the area has
prevented a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Traditionally, Kosovo has been the most
densely populated region of the former Yugoslavia; its two million inhabitants live in an
area measuring roughly forty-four hundred square miles. 1 Today, Kosovo is a flashpoint
in the Balkans which threatens to unravel the fragile peace established by the
international community in neighboring Bosnia-Hercegovina. This is so because the
international effort that produced the 1 995 Dayton Accords failed to take Kosovo into
account.
This thesis will examine the Albanian resistance movement in the Serb province
of Kosovo since the 1981 riots, including the historical origins of the conflict, the Serb
obsession with this region, the ethnic Albanian position, and implications for the
international community. The analysis will include a discussion of all elements of ethnic
Albanian opposition and its various stages of development. There are several questions
that must be addressed relating to the Albanian underground government. How can a
'Peter Prifti, "Kosova's Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Arshi Pipa and Sam
Repishti (eds.), Studies on Kosova, East European Monographs, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1984, p. 125.
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parallel ethnic Albanian state exist within Serbia? What is the structure and organization
of the "shadow" Kosovar government? Who are its leaders? What are their objectives
and demands? What is the potential of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK)?
Serbia's implementation of a number of both violent and non-violent police
tactics in an effort to dominate Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority is like nothing else in
Europe today. In addition to the massive police and military presence in Kosovo,
Belgrade has sponsored a program of repression that includes the violation of human
rights, employment discrimination, exclusionary measures in the field of education, and
control over the media. Exclusion in the area of education has paralyzed economic
development in Kosovo and has meant that the fastest growing population in Europe is
not being properly educated. Serb repression coupled with the post-Cold War economic
hardship and international sanctions, is creating an ominous situation in the region.
Ethnic Albanian inhabitants currently comprise over ninety percent of the
population and have responded to Serb repression by establishing a parallel system of
government, with independence as their ultimate goal. Recently, the Albanian opposition
has grown impatient with the lack of progress in the province and this has led to an
abandonment of peaceful resistance in favor of violence through terrorism. The
emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) illustrates the dangerous shift from
peaceful resistance to the potential for armed insurrection.
The final chapter of this study discusses several potential scenarios for conflict
and for conflict resolution in Kosovo. These scenarios include, but are not limited to, a
unified Albania, an independent Kosovo, a greater federalization of the Federal Republic
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of Yugoslavia, a restoration of autonomy, the partitioning of the province, ethnic war,
and a continuation of the current stagnant situation.
The concept of a greater Albania in the Balkans remains unrealistic. Albania
would have to spearhead the effort and does not have the political, economic, or military
means to achieve unification. Furthermore, the absence of a strong movement on behalf
of the largest concentrations of Albanians in the region makes any attempt to unify
particularly problematic.
The goal of the Kosovar opposition led by Ibrahim Rugova continues to be an
independent Kosovo. To date, only Albania has recognized the self-proclaimed Republic
of Kosovo and it appears that independence is only possible with the support of the
international community. At the time of this writing, the international community has
stressed that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia and must seek solutions through
Belgrade. It is almost certain that any attempt by Kosovo to secede from Serbia would
result in a massive Serb military deployment.
One option that has been offered as a solution in Kosovo is that of an intensified
federalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This scenario would make Kosovo
an equal republic with Serbia, the Sandzak region, Montenegro, and Vojvodina. Chances
for the adoption of this course of action are slim, however, as this idea runs counter to the
strong Serb nationalism that has fought to maintain control over the former Yugoslavia.
The reestablishment of autonomy has been suggested for Kosovo and it is this
option that the international community is most inclined to support in the future. Both
Serbs and ethnic Albanians are opposed to autonomy for Kosovo, however. Particularly
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problematic for the restoration of autonomy is the tremendous change that has occurred
in the region in recent years. An autonomous Kosovo today would be very different from
what it would have been in the days of Tito's Yugoslavia. The absence of the old
Yugoslav republics would place Kosovo under the sole control of Serbia. Alternatively,
the partitioning of the province along ethnic boundaries is a possible, but unlikely,
solution. Serbia relies on Kosovo for its vast supply of natural resources and any attempt
to divide Kosovo would surely result in a prolonged struggle for control over territory of
vital economic and religious value.
Ethnic war has plagued the Balkans for centuries, destroying lives and hindering
progress. The power of nationalism and the destructive potential of ethnic conflict was
recently witnessed in neighboring Bosnia-Hercegovina. There is nothing to prevent the
expansion of regional violence that could include Turkey, Albania, Greece, Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria. Kosovars have sought refuge in these countries and it is quite
possible that ethnic violence could lead to a massive migration of Albanians out of
Kosovo. Many of these countries are ill-equipped to deal with an influx of refugees and
remain concerned about their own minority populations.
A Fourth Balkan War would present serious problems for NATO. An expanded
conflict in the Balkans would place severe stresses and strains on the alliance as it works
to solve security challenges in Bosnia. Moreover, United States troops continue to
maintain a presence along the Macedonian border and would likely become engaged in
spillover violence from an ethnic war triggered in Kosovo.
xx
Finally, a continuation of the status quo in Kosovo could lead to further
deterioration in Serb-Albanian relations over the province. Pressure is building as Serb
repression continues unabated in Kosovo. Kosovo's separate institutions of government,
education, healthcare, and media outlets have fostered an unhealthy division between
Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Furthermore, the absence of international political and
financial support has restricted progress in Serbia and has created an economic imbalance
in the Balkans. These problems, coupled with the lack of a productive international
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We support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia and aim to see Bosnia's Balkan neighbors embarked
on the path of democracy and market reform - including Serbia's
restoration of autonomy to Kosovo2 and the return of civil society and
democracy. 3
A. THE MAKINGS OF A FOURTH BALKAN WAR?
The situation in the Serb province of Kosovo was the catalyst for the bloody
conflict that has plagued the Balkans in recent years. It is this increasingly tense
situation between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim Albanians living in this region
that provides the foundation for a potential Fourth Balkan War. This unstable situation in
Kosovo has been left largely unaddressed by the international community.
The 1 .8 million ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo deeply resent domination by a
minority Serb leadership. A number of extremely violent Albanian demonstrations in the
early 1980's, met by a brutal Serb response, was an early indicator of the potential for
violence in this province. Serb President Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo's
autonomous status in 1989 and used the Serb minority in this region to shore up his
political position. The Serb leadership has vowed never to relinquish control over this
area of the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanian inhabitants have essentially had their
2
In order to avoid confusion with regard to spelling, the following rules have been
established: "Kosovo," ending in "o" is the Serbo-Croatian spelling and will be utilized
throughout this study. In Albanian, Kosovo is spelled "Kosova" and ethnic Albanians
are referred to as Kosovars. For the purposes of this examination. Albanians in Kosovo
will be referred to as ethnic Albanians or Kosovars.
3William J. Clinton, President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of
the United States, The White House, May 1997.
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constitutional rights eliminated and, though a majority, have virtually no say in their
government. In many respects, this is the most repressive situation in Europe. Kosovo
survives today in the shadow of Bosnia's ethnic cleansing.
Recently, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), also referred to as the Liberation
Army of Kosovo, has taken responsibility for numerous acts of terrorism. This
organization is fighting to create an independent ethnic state for the numerous Muslim-
Albanians living in Kosovo. Serb authorities have implemented harsh measures in an
effort to contain the violence related to this movement, which is capturing international
attention. Human rights observers have generally been restricted from monitoring the
situation in Kosovo. Serb authorities have also stationed significant elements of the
Yugoslav Army throughout Kosovo in an effort to stem the expanding guerilla
movement. By current standards the situation in Kosovo is intractable and may lead to
war.
The ethnic Albanian population continues to grow and is expected to double in
size to almost four million in the next twenty years. This growth rate is currently the
highest in all of Europe. The interests of this expanding majority must be recognized and
dealt with, as this is clearly a problem that cannot be ignored by the West.
B. RELEVANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY
The absence of any conception of a postwar settlement or regional
solution to the Balkan conflict was especially apparent in the case of
Kosovo and by implication Macedonia.4
4Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.,
1995, p. 398.
The relations in Kosovo between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim
Albanians are tense and are liable to erupt into war. The absence of a productive
dialogue, together with the recent shift in tactics of the Kosovar opposition, could prove
disastrous. A war in Kosovo would most likely drive hundreds of thousands of refugees
out of the province. These refugees would flee into neighboring Balkan states that are
currently not able to accommodate them. The resulting shift in demographics would
most likely lead to the involvement of Turkey, Greece, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.
A conflict involving Greece and Turkey has the potential to strain the U.S. commitment
to peace in the region. The United States would be forced to mediate between two NATO
allies at war.
In 1992, President George Bush related his concerns and the potential for U.S.
involvement:
In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United
States will be prepared to employ military force against Serbs in Kosovo
and in Serbia proper. 5
Indeed, United States military involvement in a Fourth Balkan War is highly likely. As it
is, U.S. forces continue to patrol the Macedonian border and are heavily involved in
SFOR operations in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
It appears that the peaceful resistance campaign instituted by the shadow
government led by Ibrahim Rugova has broken down, resulting in a new wave of
violence. The situation was exacerbated by the signing of the December 1995 Dayton
5John M. Goshko, "Bush Threatens Military Force If Serbs Attack Ethnic Albanians,
The Washington Post, December 29, 1992, p. A 10, quoted by Alexandras K. Kyrou,
Journal ofPolitical and Military Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 1996, p. 257.
agreement. Dayton essentially "papered" over the Kosovo issue, which has led the
Albanian opposition to intensify its efforts. Furthermore, the United States has refused to
recognize Kosovo's ultimate goal of independence and has insisted that it must seek a
solution to its problems within Serbia.
Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo may resort to more violence in an effort to bring
fresh attention to their plight. A distinct cultural separation that has traditionally existed
between ethnic Albanians and Orthodox Christian Serbs has been widened by an
increase in ethnic crimes. The ethnic Albanian parallel system of government and Serb
intransigence have created a barrier to communication critical for stability. Particularly
important to United States policy is support for an increase in international involvement
which may serve to close the expanding communication gap. An effective dialogue
between the parties could ease tensions and stabilize the situation.
Although not well organized at this time, the terrorist organizations operating
within Kosovo appear to be gathering the attention of the international community. The
Serb response, as stated earlier, has been to use force in an effort to suppress this surge in
terrorist activity. Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic rose to power on the Kosovo issue and
does not appear to have the ability to allow even minimal concessions at this time.
Milosevic, the "master of Balkan politics" for the past ten years, has been able to cling
to power against tremendous internal and external pressure on his regime. He has
gathered sufficient political support to allow him to convert the presidency of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into a position of unprecedented power. To
date, the Serb leader has not granted ethnic Albanians concessions which would serve
to contradict the policy that catapulted him into power. Furthermore, the cultural
importance Serbs attach to the region remains a rigid barrier to future concessions.
Finally, ethnic Albanians are frustrated with the lack of progress, and the recent
increase in violence may be an indicator that the situation in Kosovo has reached the
point of perilous escalation. As Carl Bildt stated earlier this year;
Serbia can't be stable, prosperous, and harmonious if it does not
reconcile the issue of Kosovo. Serbia can't live as a European country
with the continuous state of repression in Kosovo. It is simply not
possible. 6
The following are findings of House Resolution 41 15 - Kosovo Peace and Democracy
Actofl994. 7
• Human rights violations in Kosovo are widespread and have worsened since
the dismissal ofhuman rights observers in July of 1993.
• The majority of the people in Kosovo voted for independence and a new
government, which has not been permitted to meet.
• Presidents Bush and Clinton have explicitly warned Serbia that the U.S. would
not tolerate Serbia's expansion of the conflict in Kosovo.
• Congress has provided for the establishment of a USIA Cultural Office in
Kosovo pursuant to Public Law 102-138.
6
"European Union's Carl Bildt Warns of Kosovo Violence," Berserkistan in Bosnia,
July 5, 1997. Online. Available http://www.linder.com/berserk/kosovo_bildt.html
'"Situation in Kosovo," Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Europe and The
Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington: 1994.
The White House has made it clear in the May 1997 National Security Strategy
that it is dedicated to the restoration of autonomy in Kosovo.
The Albanian problem is greater than the Bosnian problem and
potentially more dangerous. The disintegration of Yugoslavia began
with the abrogation by Serbia of Kosovo's autonomy. 8
We now turn to an historical overview of the conflict, which will provide the
necessary foundation for a comprehensive discussion of the Albanian resistance.
8
Sir Reginald Hibbert, "More Dangerous than Bosnia?" The World Today, Vol.
52, No. 8/9, August - September 1996, p. 230.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO
The current disorder in Kosovo has become a permanent part of the unrest that
has inundated the Balkans since the 12th Century. The conflict has matured with two
very different historical accounts regarding control over the region. There are a
number of Serb historians that claim that the Albanians are new residents of this
traditionally Serb region (see figure 1). However, in his book Kosova: The Balkan
Powder Keg, Elej Biberaj writes that for centuries the region was inhabited by both
Serbs and Albanians, with the Albanians, the direct descendants of the original settlers
of the Balkans-the Illyrians-being in the majority. 9
Dr. D.E.M. Mihas, an independent political scientist, poet, and linguist offers
the following about ethnic Albanians in Southeastern Europe:
In some cases, Albanian communities of the Balkans seem to be more
homogenous than Albania itself which is divided along major tribal,
religious, and linguistic lines which still play a significant role among
Albanians, as they do among other (European) countries first. 10
It is important to note that not all Albanians adhere to Islam, as almost one third of the
Albanians in Albania are actually Christian. "Statistics on religion seem to have paid
little attention to the fact that, because of Ottoman domination, a number of Albanians
9
Elez Biberaj, "Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg," Conflict Studies 258^ Research
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, United Kingdom, February 1993, p.
3.
10D.E.M. Mihas, "Another Balkan Dilemma: Albania and Kosovo," Contemporary
Review, Vol 269, No. 1566, London, England, 1996, p. 13.
Figure 1. Orientation Map of Kosovo (From Ref. Elez Biberaj, Kosova: The Balkan
Powder Keg)
8
obtained Islamic names without necessarily losing their Christian faith." 11 However, the
Albanian population in Kosovo is almost entirely Muslim. Consequently, religion is a
much larger factor for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo than in Albania proper.
The Kosovars are associated with one of two groups that comprise the Albanian
population in Albania. These two groups are known as the Ghegs and the Tosks. The
Ghegs populate northern Albania and it is from this area that Kosovars first settled in
Kosovo. 12 The Tosks inhabit southern Albania and together these groups have
struggled for control of this Southeastern European state.
A. KOSOVO: A SERB HOLY LAND
The account of Prince Lazar and his defeat by the Ottoman Turks on the Field
of Blackbirds during the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 dominates Serb history. The
significance of the Battle of Kosovo to Serbia and the territory upon which it was
fought has become sacred for the Serbs. It was on the evening before the battle that
Lazar related:
Whoever is a Serb and of Serbian birth, and who does not come to
Kosovo Polje to do battle against the Turks, let him have neither a male
nor a female offspring, Let him have no crop,... 13
The Serbs believe that it was this Turkish victory that started more than five centuries
of rule and forced them from Kosovo. Additionally, it is believed that during Ottoman




13Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y., 1993, p. 39.
entered a period of economic stagnation.
Kosovo became a symbol of steadfast courage and sacrifice for honor,
much as the Alamo for Americans - only Kosovo was the Alamo writ
large, where Serbs lost their whole nation, but in the words of Sam
Houston, it would be remembered and avenged. 14
Kosovo has often been referred to as the "Serb Jerusalem." The sacred nature
of this area for Serbs has been a colossal barrier to a peaceful solution to the issue.
This region was the heart of Serbia where large numbers of monasteries and churches
were constructed. The strong religious attachment to the region made Turkish
occupation all the more painful. Serbs migrated northward in search of a better life, as
Orthodox Christian Serbs were considered inferior to their conquerors and were
forbidden to own land in Kosovo. 15 Serb history of Kosovo presents the Albanians as
occupiers who crossed the Albanian mountains to settle in Serbia. Regardless of the
two different historical accounts, it is quite clear that during this period the Albanian
population expanded while the Serb population dwindled in Kosovo.
Blind glorification of their medieval past has prevented the Serbs from a
national self-reckoning based on a more accurate reading of the situation
in Kosovo. 16
This commentary has been presented because it stands at the center of the conflict in
Kosovo. Serbs appear to view any restoration of autonomy to Kosovo as a loss of
14 Alex N. Dragnich and Slavko P. Todorovich, The Saga of Kosovo, Columbia
University Press, New York, N.Y., 1984, p. 27.
15
"Situation in Kosovo," Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle




Serbia's territorial integrity. Vukasin Jokanovic, Serbia's Federal Minister for Internal
Affairs, stated the following: "Yugoslavia cannot give in where her integrity is
concerned." 17
B. THE END OF TURKISH RULE
The Albanian population fought for independence in Kosovo through an
organization known as the League of Prizren and achieved some degree of freedom
from the Turks in the summer of 1912. 18 However, this situation would soon change
with the onset of the First Balkan War. The Serbs finally won control of Kosovo after
soundly defeating the Turks during the First Balkan War of 1912. Serb control over
the region was coupled with intense efforts to dominate almost every aspect of
Kosovo's culture. The following originates from a Carnegie Endowment report about
Serb actions in Kosovo as early as 1912:
Houses and whole villages were reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent
populations massacred in mass, incredible acts of violence, pillage, and
brutality of every kind-such were the means which were employed by
the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation
of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians. 19
The Albanian population was divided between the new state of Albania and the
Serb province of Kosovo. Additionally, Serb leadership attempted to alter the
17
"Kosovo - only in Serbia," Serbia Bulletin, May 1996. Online. Available
http://www.yugoslavia.com/Bulletin/96/9605/9605 1 3.htm
18
"Situation in Kosovo," p. 105.
I9
Iseljavanje Arnanta, GRMCK, Gvidara and Simac (eds.), L'nettogage ethnique, pp.
161-185, Cf. Phillip Cohen, Desecrating the Holocaust, p. 30. quoted by Mark Almond,
Europe 's Backyard War, William Heinemann Ltd, Great Britain, 1994, p. 193.
11
demographics in Kosovo so as to make the region more accommodating for the Serb
population.
Despite fierce ethnic opposition, over 40,000 Orthodox Slav peasants
moved into Kosovo and half a million ethnic Albanians were forced to
emigrate, mainly to Albania, Macedonia, and Turkey. 20
Clearly, both the Serb and ethnic Albanian populations endured tremendous hardship
during these changes in regional control. The loss of land, homes, and livelihoods
contributed to an increasing trend toward economic backwardness. This instability
further frustrated relations between the two inhabitants which resulted in ethnic hatred
and genocide. Peace and security in Kosovo were remote for both populations during
this tumultuous period regardless of the regime in power. It was not until World War
I that ethnic Albanians began to feel some relief with regard to Serb dominance.
Between 1916 and 1918, Kosovo was occupied by Austro-Hungarian
forces and nearly 300 Albanian schools were re-opened after a period of
Serb closure. 21
Albania proper annexed Kosovo during World War II. The Italian dictator,
Mussolini, invaded the Balkans in 1939 and this action was coupled with a movement
to create a greater Albania. It was after the Italian surrender in September of 1943
that the Germans inherited Albania and supported Albanian nationalism to include the
movement for a greater Albania.
20Barbara Frey, "The Minnesota Plan: Recommendations for Preventing Gross
Human Rights Violations in Kosovo," Minnesota Advocatesfor Human Rights,
Occasional Paper # 8, February, 1993, p. 2.
21 Derek Hall, Albania and the Albanians, Pinter Reference, New York, N.Y., 1994,
p. 201.
12
The defeat of Germany and the end of World War II effectively ended the
campaign for a greater Albania. The Albanian population has never truly acted with a
strong sense of uniformity. The Albanian population spread from Albania throughout
Southeastern Europe. Interestingly, there does not appear to be a strong attachment to
Albania proper on behalf of the Kosovars and other Albanians living outside Albania.
The Kosovars and their Albanian brothers were never able to build an effective
coalition to achieve a greater Albania. This is due in large part to the vast Albanian
tribal, linguistic, and religious differences alluded to earlier. In truth, Kosovars have
enjoyed a better living standard and more freedom then Albanians in other areas of the
Balkans. Nevertheless, the Albanian resistance to Serb dominance has been
unswerving in Kosovo.
Marshal Josip Broz Tito and his form of Communism successfully unified the
various republics (now independent states) that encompassed the former Yugoslavia.
Kosovo was established as an autonomous region within the former Yugoslavia by
1947 and eventually became known as the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo
in 1969. Tito devolved power to the various individual Yugoslav republics which was
far from the standard in the former Soviet Union. Titoist federalism with its loose
decentralized style would provide substantial breathing room for the ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo. It was this space permitted by Tito that served as a foundation for the
modern ethnic Albanian opposition movement.
The unusual Yugoslav relaxation during this period strengthened Albanian
nationalist feelings regarding Kosovo. Titoist policies appeared to favor ethnic
13
Albanians and this resulted in a significant alteration of regional demography. Almost
200,000 Serbs were allegedly forced to leave or left Kosovo during the twenty year
period, 1961-1981. 22 It is important to note that although unprecedented rights were
granted, this freedom was Yugoslav freedom and not part of an effort for a greater
Albania. The 1 950 Tito-Stalin split ended any effort to incorporate Albania into the
former Yugoslavia.
Massive amounts of economic assistance flowed from Yugoslav Federal
development funds and from the World Bank. The Serbs accused Albanian leadership
in Kosovo of using this money for unlawful purposes. The accusations included the
alleged Albanian purchase of large tracts of Serb held land. However, it is hard to
gather evidence to support any large scale "buy out" of the Serbs. This mid 1950's to
late 1960's Yugoslav government in Belgrade was deluged with a tremendous increase
of Serb complaints. A shift in power towards the Albanian majority was accompanied
by a rise in Serb nationalism. Albanian complaints of police abuse where also high
during the Tito years as the Yugoslav government tried to control the province.
Yugoslav efforts to develop this southern region of Serbia resulted in an extremely
high growth rate. The ethnic Albanian population continues to grow and is expected
to double in size over the next twenty years. This tremendous growth rate is currently
the highest in all of Europe. These figures do not bode well for Serbs who seek to
maintain their stronghold on the region.
22 Dragnich and Todorovich, p. 158.
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The Tito years yielded an aggressive campaign to reverse the educational
deficiencies of Kosovars. This resulted in the construction of numerous Albanian
schools and a dedication to higher university level education in the capital of Pristina.
Although in better economic shape than many areas of the Balkans, Kosovo was
perceived as "backward" with little or no productivity. The economic assistance
alluded to earlier was designed to modernize all aspects of Kosovo. Unfortunately,
Alexander Rankovic, minister of internal affairs and vice president of Yugoslavia was
adamant about strict control over the Albanians. It was during Rankovic' s tenure that
the modern Serb strategy of police repression was developed and these activities had a
very detrimental effect on provincial development.
Tito removed Rankovic from power in 1966 and softened his administration's
approach to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Unfortunately for Serbia, Tito may have
done more harm then good, as the following effectively illustrates the rise of Albanian
nationalism:
By removing police pressure and granting more concessions to the
Kosovars to ensure their loyalty to Yugoslavia, the government had
unwittingly assisted the Albanians in becoming more conscious of their
rights and strengths. 23
Ethnic Albanian national awareness and a new sense of liberty led to violent
demonstrations in 1968. The demand for an independent ethnic Albanian Kosovo was
the cause of the violence. As alluded to earlier, a Kosovar goal of a greater Albania
was not as strong as the desire for an independent republic. In light of the emergence
23 Miranda Vickers, The Albanians, I. B. Tauris, New York, N.Y., 1995, p. 192.
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of Albanian nationalism during this period, it is important to acknowledge that
Kosovars were increasingly wary of Communism. 24
An economic crisis in the early 1970's exacerbated the tense environment in
Kosovo. It has been suggested that the cultural barrier erected by both Albanians and
Serbs was an impediment to economic growth. Albanians insisted on their own
language, schools, and a strict adherence to social customs. This was in direct
opposition to and conflicted with, the Serb population's daily routine common to all of
Serbia. The collision of these two different cultures was not conducive to
productivity.
C. PRISTINA AND MODERN RESISTANCE
Albanian students staged a series of violent protests in Pristina during the early
1980's. The demonstrations centered on a renewed sense of Albanian nationalism.
Ethnic Albanian students and numerous Serb policemen were killed during the
violence. Additionally, destruction of Serb monuments and damage to religious
facilities in Kosovo further aggravated the strained relations. The Pristina protests and
subsequent crackdown during the Spring of 1981 were indicative of the hostile
atmosphere that disrupted life in Kosovo for centuries and served as a prelude to future
Serb repression.
Nothing needed changing in the system, and the cause lay not in the
socio-economic development of Kosovo, but in nationalism, which had
24Viktor Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," Problems ofCommunism, March-
April, 1983, p. 47.
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been exploited from abroad. 25
The protests, instituted primarily by students, confused older Yugoslav
Communist leaders. The leadership implemented a campaign to rid Kosovo of ethnic
Albanian nationalism. Educational cooperation with institutions external to Kosovo was
terminated and a purge of provincial leaders was instituted. 26 A negative media blitz
was directed toward Albania, as Yugoslav Central Committee leaders interpreted the
source of Kosovo's problems as Tirana, Albania. 27 These actions represented a grave
misunderstanding of Kosovo's problems and a failure to acknowledge that 78 percent
of the population was making their interests known.
The April 2, 1981, joint communique of the Federal Presidency and of
the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia confidently asserted that Albanian nationalism has
nothing in common with the demands of most in Kosovo. 28
The inability to comprehend inequality and Albanian nationalism set an
unhealthy precedent for the handling of current crisis. In the end, the number of dead
and wounded during the heightened violence of the 1980's varies with the source, but
it was this violence that set the stage for the modern conflict.
25Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, "The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia:





28Sta Se Dogadjalo na Kosovu, p. 21, quoted by Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo,"
Problems ofCommunism, March-April, 1993, p. 61.
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The publication of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences 1986
Memorandum had a profound effect on the Kosovars. This document essentially stated
that Serbia had been unfairly discriminated against for years and that the Yugoslav
League of Communists was largely to blame. Slobodan Milosevic's effort to gain
power in Serbia led to a certain type of de-Titoization campaign. The Yugoslav
League of Communists and those in power were to blame for problems that afflicted
all of the former Yugoslavia. The Memorandum stated quite clearly that autonomy
granted to Kosovo was wrong and criticized the Albanian leadership governing the
province. Charges against the Albanian population continued and seemed to reach an
apex when Slobodan Milosevic arrived in Kosovo in an attempt to appease the restless
Serb population. Milosevic was clearly exploiting the Serb minority status for
maximum political gain. In an April speech in 1987, the Serb leader addressed crowds
of Serbs in Kosovo and stated:
You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your
meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your
land just because it's difficult to live, because you are pressured by
injustice and degradation. It was never part of the Serbian and
Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilize
when it's time to fight. You should stay here for the sake of your
ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled
and descendants disappointed. 29
It was by November 1988 that Milosevic began to lay the foundations of a plan
that would eliminate Kosovo's autonomous status. The Kosovo party leadership was
dismissed and ethnic Albanians feared the worst as Serb police were deployed to
29Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia Death ofA Nation, Penguin Books USA,
1996, p. 38.
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control Kosovo. Milosevic installed his own leadership and this was met with
shocking turmoil. There was a number of violent clashes and protests as a new Serb
constitution released in March of 1989 eliminated Kosovo's autonomous status.
Moreover, a federal constitution was rammed through a disintegrating Yugoslav
government in April of 1992. It was evident that Slobodan Milosevic was tailoring his
Serb governing apparatus to suit Serb interests. Incredibly, Milosevic pointed to the
democratic ideals contained within these documents as the international community
squeezed Serbia with sanctions.
Kosovo's government at the local level, state enterprises, newspapers,
television, and academic positions were all placed under control of Serb authorities. A
large segment of the Albanian population joined the unemployed and were no longer
able to sustain their already low standard of living, as their annual per capita income
was less than $400.00. 30 The University of Pristina was renamed after Dositej
Obradovic, a Serbian scholar. 31 Over 800 Albanian professors were fired at the
university. 32 Furthermore, Serbo-Croatian supplanted Albanian as the official language
of Kosovo. Latin street names were replaced by Cyrillic Serbian names. 33 Numerous
monuments to Albanian culture were destroyed or ripped down during this period.
30Charles J. Brown, "Keeping it Safe for Serbia," Freedom Review, Vol. 23, No. 5,







Clearly, the new Serb leadership was trying to compensate for perceived Albanian
hostility toward the Serb culture in Kosovo.
Slobodan Milosevic utilized the 600th anniversary of Prince Lazar's death to
address the Serb people in a speech that effected all of Yugoslavia. It was in this
speech that Milosevic essentially mobilized the Serb population for a greater Serbia.
Unfortunately, for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Milosevic's use of the Serb minority
status to cement his political position would leave the Albanian majority with little
hope for reestablishing their independence.
Albanians responded aggressively to Milosevic's constitutional sideshow with a
vote to separate from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Serb leaders in
Belgrade declared all underground referendums illegal and launched a firm crackdown
on all demonstrations.
20
III. SERB STRATEGY AND THE KOSOVARS
On the subject of Kosovo, the Serbian province where the Clinton
Administration has repeatedly asked Mr. Milosevic to halt abuses
against the majority Albanian population, Mr. Milosevic replied,
according to the cable: "It is only of interest to a few American
Congressmen. We will solve it our own way."34
The Serbs have traditionally instituted an array of both violent and non-violent
police tactics to force ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Presently, control over the
region is achieved by a massive Serb military and police presence. The current
disposition of Serb forces in Kosovo includes more than 40,000 active duty military
troops and at least 30,000 police officers. 35 Ethnic Albanians are keenly aware of Serb
military potential and recognize that they do not possess the means with which to
wage an armed insurrection.
After Milosevic had established himself as the leader of the Serbian Socialist
Party (SPS) in 1990, he began to support legislation that would ensure Serb control
over Kosovo. The Serb parliament established a law known as "Special Circumstance"
on labor relations in Kosovo, which allowed for Serbs to take jobs from Kosovars/6
The goal of the Milosevic Administration was to ethnically cleanse the region of
Kosovars and reverse the Serb minority status. This plan would be implemented
34
Jane Perlez, "Cable Reveals a Combative Serb Leader," The New York Times,
August 21, 1997.
35
"Strategic Assessment," Institutefor National Strategic Studies, 1 997, p. 1 52.
36Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, "The Minnesota Plan: Recommendations
for Preventing Gross Human Rights Violations in Kosovo," February, 1993, p. 1-4.
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through the aforementioned employment discrimination, police violence, reform in
education, and control of the media.
A. POLICE VIOLENCE AND THE YUGOSLAV ARMY (YA)37
The following description of Serb anti-Albanian tactics was uncovered in a
paper written in 1937 by Dr. Vasa Cubrilovic, a member of the group that plotted the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914.
In order to create an atmosphere of fear and a willingness to leave,
the Serbian state ought to use very un-Balkan tactics: The law must
be enforced to the letter... fines and imprisonments, the ruthless
application of all police dispositions, such as the prohibition of
smuggling, cutting forests, damaging farmland, leaving dogs unchained,
compulsory labor and any other measures that an experienced police
force can contrive.
38
Dr. Cubrilovic pioneered early Serb police tactics that were used widely against
Albanians. The relatively non-violent tactics referred to above were coupled with
Vasa's other, more violent tactics, and it was this deadly combination that made Serb
police action so efficient.
There is one more method which Serbia used very effectively after
1878, the secret burning of Albanian villages and town quarters. 39
37The Yugoslav Army (YA) used to be referred to as the Yugoslav National Army
(YNA) or the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) prior to its reorganization in 1992. The
elements of the YA currently stationed in Kosovo receive their command and control
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Third Army located in Nis, Serbia.
38 Almond, p. 195.
39Vasa Cubrilovic, "Deportation of Albanians," in Boze Covic (ed.), Roots ofSerbian
Aggression, Center for Foreign Languages, Zagreb, Croatia, 1993, p. 123.
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Alexander Rankovic, the former Yugoslav Minister of Interior, developed a
menacing security police force to carry out an anti-Albanian mission during the late
1950's and early 1960's. This use of a Serb dominated police force did not attract
significant foreign attention that often occurs when using military power in domestic
affairs. Rankovic' s style was not unlike that suggested by Cubrilovic almost thirty
years earlier. The Rankovic repression was not scrutinized or evaluated because of the
stature of his political position. 40 This Stalinist approach to internal control did not
entirely end with the removal of Rankovic in 1966. Although Tito removed Rankovic
and allowed Kosovo unprecedented autonomy by the late 1960's, the harsh Rankovic
measures were restored twenty years later by Slobodan Milosevic.
Serbia has never faced significant armed Albanian resistance until the recent
emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK). However, the UCK does not
possess sophisticated weapons that Serbia maintains in its police and military arsenal.
The Albanians in Kosovo were never able to acquire the military power common to
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia that migrated into non-Serb hands prior to the recent
hostilities.
In 1989 during the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy, Milosevic acted quickly
in replacing Albanians with Serbs in positions of power. There was a multitude of
Albanian intellectuals and military officers arrested at this time. The motivation for
such arrests was the fear that Albanian leadership would plot to overthrow the newly
installed Serb provincial government. It has been estimated that 4,000 ethnic Albanian
40 Vickers, p. 191.
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police officers were dismissed from their posts since 1990. 41 The quick transition of
provincial control that was supported by the Yugoslav Army (YNA), allowed for the
successful retention of maximum military assets. The support provided by the
Yugoslav Army was not welcome by an agitated Albanian population and this
intervention served as an example for the rest of the former Yugoslavia.
Kosovo taught the YNA and the Serbian political class a fateful and
misleading lesson. Because the deployment of a massive paramilitary
force and the evident willingness to use it had cowed open rebellion by
the Albanians in the province after 1981, The YNA's generals and
Milosevic's political allies concluded that the threat of force and the
occasional salutary use of it in localized form would suffice to
intimidate any separatists in other republics. 42
Serb leadership discovered that a transition to a more domestic police-like organization
for security was essential. Nevertheless, Serb officials have stationed soldiers and
heavily armed police in Kosovo.43
Inevitably YNA methods of defending the revolution in Kosovo were
seen very negatively by Kosovar Albanians. For these ordinary citizens,
the army was an occupying force, denying them human rights, and
silencing legitimate grievances. 44
41 Situation in Kosovo, p. 99.
42 Almond, p. 207.
43 Novi Vjesnik, (Zagreb), Trans in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service,
Daily Report: Eastern Europe, Washington, D.C., - FBIS EEU, 92-238, December,
10, 1992, p. 47.
44 Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, Civil-Military Relations in the
Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, Westview Press, 1996, The Yugoslav Army:
Trauma and Transition, Robin Alison Remington, p. 160.
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The Yugoslav Army (YA) has been riddled with de-politicization and financial
problems, but their vast inventory of military hardware must be recognized for its
potential. In the years prior to 1991, the former Yugoslav National Army (YNA) was
to employ the "burnt land model" in Kosovo in an effort to control ethnic Albanian
disturbances. 45 Their goal was to disorganize a mass ethnic Albanian revolt and ensure
that support from Albania was effectively blocked.
Currently, the Yugoslav Army (YA) methodology is much the same and their
presence in Kosovo includes the Pristina Corps which is headquartered in Pristina.
The Pristina Corps consists of the following basic units: an armored
brigade, two motorized brigades, an artillery-missile regiment, and an
anti-tank artillery-missile brigade.
46
It is believed that the majority of YA forces presently garrisoned in Kosovo were
relocated to the province after withdrawal from Macedonia in 1991. The Yugoslav
Army elements deployed throughout Kosovo receive orders via Pristina from the Serb-
led Third Army located in Nis, Serbia. The total force structure for the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia includes 113,900 active duty troops which include 43,000
conscripts.
47 These figures include ethnic Albanians who continue to be forcibly
drafted into service with the Yugoslav Army. Many of these draftees were sent to
45Vladimir Jovanovic, "Vision of Hell and Burnt Land," April 26, 1996. Online.





"The Military Balance 1996/1997," The International Institutefor Strategic Studies,
Oxford University Press, London, 1996, p. 102.
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fight in other areas of the former Yugoslavia prior to the 1 995 Dayton Accords.
Additionally, the YA maintains a reserve element of almost 400,000 personnel for
mobilization during times of national emergency. 48
The recent rise in hostilities in Kosovo has made this region of Serbia a less
than desirable duty station for Serb security forces. The majority of police and
military personnel are recruited from a variety of different areas outside of Kosovo.
Many of the personnel currently serving in the region were trying to avoid service in
the army, especially when the Serbs were fighting in Croatia. Military personnel and
police officers that receive orders to Kosovo usually do not consider their duty station
a path to future promotion. The Serb security establishment has a frustrating and
rather overwhelming task of trying to control the almost two million ethnic Albanians.
This frustration has often been transferred into brutal action when dealing with the
unwieldy hostile population. Ethnic crimes common to other areas of the former
Yugoslavia have also permeated the atmosphere in Kosovo. The harassment of ethnic
Albanians by the military and police has reached unprecedented levels.
The Serb dominated Kosovo police force continues to be heavily armed and
patrols Kosovo intimidating Albanians on a regular basis. This intimidation is similar
to the Cubrilovic - Rankovic strategy alluded to earlier. In February of 1997, the
pro-Milosevic Belgrade daily, Politika Ekspres, reported that a 30 year old ethnic
Albanian died while in the custody of Serb security forces. The Albanian community
expressed strong feelings that this prisoner was tortured to death by Serb security
48
"The Military Balance 1996/1997," p. 102.
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forces. The police have related that the individual committed suicide after admitting to
membership in the Liberation Army of Kosovo. 49 There were five UCK members
arrested and charged with planning terrorist activities over the 1997 May Day holiday.
These arrests have come in the wake of a police "round-up" of numerous alleged
members of the Liberation Army of Kosovo.
A savage and pathological instance of ethnic hatred is that of a police
officer slashing a Serbian symbol on the chest of an 1 8 year old
Albanian. 50
The notorious Serbian bank robber and war criminal Zeljko Raznjatovic, known
as Arkan, was elected a deputy in Kosovo. He has rather openly advocated ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo in an effort to defeat the Albanian separatist movement. 51
Arkan' s Volunteer Guard known as the Tigers have deployed to Kosovo in what may
be a move to control the black market in the region. 52 The aforementioned incidents
have been included as a small sample of the type of police action that occurs daily in
Kosovo.
Those tortured or beaten by the police have little recourse in Kosovo as
the rule of law is practically nonexistent. 53
49
Patrick Moore, "Mysterious Death in Kosovo Prison," OMRI Daily Digest,
February, 27, 1997. (http://www.omri.cz)




52Tim Judah, The Serbs, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1997, p. 186.
""Open Wounds," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, New York, N.Y., March, 1993, p.
xiii.
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It is important to acknowledge that Serb police forces do in fact tolerate some
parallel activities of ethnic Albanians, and even permit human rights organizations to
exist.
54 However, it is quite possible that there is a perception of toleration, as
certainly the security forces cannot maintain constant supervision over all aspects of
the vast Albanian majority. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International
and Helsinki's Human Rights Watch report anually on human rights violations in the
province.
The leadership in Belgrade has not limited its repression of Albanians to simply
military and police action to maintain control in Kosovo.
Serbian officials resettled refugees in Kosovo, often against their will
and in defiance of warnings from the international community that the
newcomers could provoke the Albanian majority. 55
These refugees were from war ravaged areas of Bosnia and the Krajina region of
Croatia. The Serb refugees have shown no desire to be Milosevic's instrument for
ethnic balance in Kosovo. In June of this year, several Serb families that were
resettled in Kosovo went on a hunger strike in Belgrade to protest Milosevic.
The Serbs demanded apartments and other social benefits that they say
the authorities promised them in 1991. The government settled the
families in Istok, Kosovo after they fled their homes in Slovenia and
Croatia. 56
54 Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, p. 117.
55
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Interestingly, Milosevic's Belgrade regime continues to receive tremendous
pressure from minority Serb parties such as the Serbian Civic Alliance (GSS). This
organization has openly protested the ill-treatment of Albanian detainees and expressed
its concern about the potential for suffering among the innocent. 57
B. EXCLUSION IN EDUCATION
It is evident through the protests of resettled Serbs that the Milosevic-sponsored
Serb control over the region has not solved Kosovo's problems. Belgrade has not
reversed the educational problems, economic stagnation, or the backward nature of the
region. Police repression has not improved the conditions for Kosovo and only
appears to restrict vital social and economic progress required for the survival of all
inhabitants.
Exclusionary measures in the field of education have done irreparable damage
to progress in the province. The Serb leadership in Belgrade closed schools and
revoked the Kosovar's right to pursue an education upon the introduction of a new
decree in 1991.
The new uniform program and curricula resulted in the closing down of
the Educational Administration of Kosovo, of the Kosovo Text-Book
Publishing Institute and of other institutions and facilities in the field of
education. 58
Serb police forces arrested large numbers of intellectuals. This was part of an effort to
57Kosovo Information Center, "Minor Serb Party Protests Brutality Against Albanian
Detainees in Kosovo," No. 1079, February 20, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report.
Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-02-20.ksv.html
58
"The Field of Education," Kosovo Albanians I, Online. Humanitarian Law Center,
Spotlight Report No. 6, August 1993.
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decapitate any potential revolutionary movement that might be led by educated ethnic
Albanians. Former military officers were also included, as they supposedly had the
type of training to organize such insurrections. 59
The independent ethnic Albanian education system in Kosovo was eliminated
after the revocation of autonomy in Kosovo. A new curriculum eliminated Albanian
language instruction and was oriented more toward the study of Serb culture.60
Many Albanian teachers refused to recognize the new curriculum and, as
a result, Serbian authorities began demanding that teachers sign a
loyalty oath. When most of the teachers refused to sign, they were
dismissed. 61
The changes in the field of education made by the Milosevic administration have only
served to restrict progress in Kosovo. The majority of the population has no state
sponsored structure for elementary or secondary school education. Certainly, this will
not cure problems of economic stagnation and ethnic conflict. These wasteful
measures are an amazing failure to train Europe's fastest growing population for future
mobilization in the workforce. By current standards, the economic gap between
Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans will continue to expand and may result in the
future decay of Serbia's financial status.
The Albanian population, under Dr. Ibrahim Rugova's leadership, has worked
to establish a parallel school system. Kosovars have established schools in their homes
39






and secured the use of some academic facilities so as to hold class. Rugova was even
able to negotiate an education accord that would allow the unconditional return of all
ethnic Albanian students to all school premises and the University of Pristina. 62
Unfortunately, the Milosevic regime has simply refused to implement the September
1996 agreement. This action is typical of Milosevic's political maneuvering. It
appears he only signed the accord with Rugova to show the international community
that he was capable of concessions, but like with so many other agreements, Milosevic
has failed to keep his word.
C. CONTROL OF THE MEDIA
Since 1990, Kosovars have had their ability to communicate via television,
radio, and newspaper manipulated by the Serb regime in Belgrade. All ethnic
Albanian broadcasting was closed down and any future development of ethnic
Albanian programming has been discouraged. Specifically, Radio and Television of
Pristina was closed by Serb police and the staff was dismissed. 6j Currently, the only
radio and television programs that are broadcast in the Albanian language are those
translated from Serb programs. Kosovars feel that the aforementioned Serb
programming is simply propaganda. However, Belgrade claims that Serbia has
accommodated its minorities through the translated programming. Furthermore, Serb
62Kosovo Information Center, "Unimplemented Education Accord - Exemplary,
According to Serbian Prime Minister," No. 1 208, Kosovo Daily Report.
63Kosovo Information Center, "The Media, Publishing, Culture," No. 1024,
December 3, 1996. Online. Kosovo Daily Report . August 31, 1997. Available
http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/96- 1 2-03_l .ksv.html
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leadership contends that there are no barriers in place that prevent ethnic Albanian
television and radio stations from being established in Kosovo.
The Secretary of Information says that he has had no requests for the
creation of new television and radio stations in Kosovo. Albanian
leaders cite economic difficulties as the main barrier to attempting to
establish a new station.
64
Newspapers were not immune from Serb influence either, as ethnic Albanian
journalists were fired and their periodicals reconfigured to meet new standards.
Currently, there are two remaining independent papers that serve the province of Kosovo.
These ethnic Albanian papers appear to be limited to only weekly distribution. Koha is
the most prominent political weekly and has attracted the finest journalists. 65 The other
two prominent papers are Zeri which is an independent weekly written in Albanian and
Bujku which is the most influential newspaper for Kosovars. 66 Additionally, foreign
journals are not sold openly in Kosovo for fear of police harassment.67 The strict control
of Serbia's borders probably does not allow for the entry of sizable amounts of foreign
material beyond that which is successfully smuggled into the region.
The bitter, and perhaps cynical, outcome of the media situation in Kosovo
is that many of the still existing Albanian papers are not as fully critical of
the self proclaimed Albanian authorities as they might have been under
other circumstances.68
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Sadly, this intense state control over the media exists not just in Kosovo, but
throughout Serbia. The inability to have access to an independent, relatively non-biased
news network during the age of information, is paralyzing not just Kosovars, but also
Serbia. The constraints placed on the media have stifled the free flow of ideas that
contribute to progress in the society. Open lines of communication are vital to relations
in Kosovo because they provide a medium for understanding. The failure to
communicate effectively has driven Orthodox Christian Serbs and ethnic Albanians
further apart over the last six years aggravating an historically volatile relationship. The
restoration of an unrestricted media would certainly help to dissolve the information
barrier that has been in place since 1990.
D. ETHNIC ALBANIAN UNEMPLOYMENT
Mass layoffs in the Kosovar work force have essentially stripped ethnic
Albanians of their ability to support their large extended families. It was alluded to
earlier that the Serbs have failed to provide an atmosphere conducive to educating
Europe's fastest growing population. Instead, over eighty percent of Albanians who
worked in the public sector in Kosovo have lost their jobs and were replaced by Serbs
since 1990.69 Many of these Albanians have returned to an agrarian lifestyle and struggle
to survive. The most common Serb explanation for the large scale ethnic Albanian
unemployment is as follows:
69Kosovo Information Center, "Kosovo, A Nation Struggling to Break Free From
Serbian Occupation, Employment and Health-care," No. 1024, December 3, 1996.
Online. Kosovo Daily Report. August 31, 1997. Available http://www.hri.org
/news/balkans/kosova/96- 12-03_l.ksv.html
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The Albanians are refusing to use their rights and a large number of ethnic
Albanians have wilfully abandoned their enterprises and government
institutions, obviously in response to the orders of their secessionist
leaders.
70
It is true that many Kosovars have continued to serve in their government
occupations. Sadly, most of these individuals, regardless of true intentions, have been
labeled filthy collaborators who are loyal only to the Serb regime. Certainly, this is a
problem because it stands in the way of rectifying Kosovo's tremendous employment
crisis. There are many Kosovars who refuse to accept jobs that are "outside" of the
recently established "parallel system," as to do so would be to indicate defacto
recognition of the Serb regime.
The absence of Kosovars from the workplace has had a profound impact on the
ability to sustain an effective health care program in Kosovo. The medical profession has
faced a stiff uphill battle to acquire properly trained personnel. The loss of state
sponsored health care has created a dangerous situation for the rapidly expanding
population. The inability to acquire medical supplies, trained personnel, and appropriate
facilities has had an adverse effect on the population physically and psychologically.
Serbian law officially allows for the operation of private health care
facilities that are properly registered pursuant to the relevant regulations.
According to many Albanian physicians, however, permits for private
institutions are issued in a highly selective and discriminatory manner.
Clinics are in continuous danger of being closed by Serbian authorities,
and their staffs in danger of being harassed and detained by police. 71
70Kosovo Information Center, "Kosovo, A Nation Struggling to Break Free From
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The problems in the health care profession poignantly illustrate that as long as
Kosovars are restricted from leadership positions in Kosovo, the great divide between the
two ethnic groups will continue to expand. This divide is problematic in that it has the
potential to create an unhealthy permanent Serb dominance and an improper balance in
the society.
Historically, both Serbs and Kosovars have endured the pain of one ethnic group
dominating the other until an independent external force changes the situation. An
external force has been designed by the international community to "change" the
deplorable situation in neighboring Bosnia-Hercegovina. Unfortunately, the Dayton
agreement and its participants that brokered the cessation of hostilities failed to address
Kosovo. The peace accords did not recognize Kosovo as the catalyst for the current
conflict and the possible origin for another Balkan war.
U.S. policy had quietly shifted to the position that Kosovo was an internal
affair of Serbia, just as it accepted that the independence movement in
Chechnya was a Russian internal affair. Efforts to defend the aggrieved
and abused human rights of Albanians remained declarations only. 72
The NATO led Stabilization Force (SFOR) has been assigned the very task of
implementing the peace agreement or "changing" the situation in Bosnia. The
international community has related that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Serb
leaders are keenly aware of international opinion and have continued their volatile
72Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.,
1995, p. 399.
35
campaign to stifle Kosovars through police violence, counterproductive education
reform, control of the media, and discrimination in the workplace.
36
IV. THE KOSOVAR OPPOSITION
On one hand, Serbian authorities tolerate the ''parallel" and pro-Kosovo
activities of Albanians, allowing even Albanian human rights
organizations to exist. On the other hand, Serbian authorities keep a
tight lid on Albanian aspirations for independence through a program of
forced displacement, harassment, arrest, interrogation, and torture. 73
A. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARLIAMENT
Traditionally, ethnic Albanian political parties in Kosovo have not been very
well organized. The first Albanian attempt to organize an opposition to Serb
domination was the League of Prizren established in 1878. The League of Prizren was
a weak nationalist movement that attempted to unite the ethnic Albanian population in
Southeastern Europe. Their goal was to build a "Greater Albania." Ironically, it was
the most recent onset of Serb repression that led the Albanians to organize politically,
as they were previously unable to express their interests with even the smallest degree
of solidarity. However, Serb security forces have not permitted Kosovar legislators to
govern in an open manner. They have attempted to arrest anyone trying to attend pre-
planned political gatherings or rallies. The aforementioned has made elections and
governing the region a particularly challenging endeavor.
The 1989 revocation of autonomy in Kosovo triggered the campaign to
establish the province as an independent republic. The majority of the legislators in
the Kosovo Assembly and provincial government was ethnic Albanian and voted for
73«Open Wounds, p. xiii.
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independence. The Serb response was to suspend the Kosovo Assembly and this
action led to the establishment of the underground government. These former
members of the provincial government do not participate in federal and republic
elections. The ethnic Albanian population forgoes the opportunity for representation
when it does not pursue seats in the Yugoslav Federal Assembly. This non-
participation is essential to the Republic of Kosovo's declaration of independence. The
smallest degree of participation would indicate an acceptance of Belgrade's rule over
the region.
The parliament has never been able to convene as an entire legislative body.
Members of parliament have met in secret to discuss initiatives and "govern" the
province. This inability to work in an open forum has had a detrimental effect on the
organizational aspect of the Albanian resistance. The Serbs tolerate the existence of
this unseen government largely because of its invisibility. Additionally, Belgrade has
been under the watchful eye of the international community since the outset of
hostilities in 1989. Although the focus was certainly on Bosnia-Hercegovina, Belgrade
was still forced to deal with the international pressure of economic sanctions.
1. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)
The leader of the ethnic Albanian struggle for reform in Kosovo is Dr. Ibrahim
Rugova. A poet, university professor, and former head of the Kosovo Writers
Association, Rugova has worked particularly hard to present Kosovar interests
throughout the international community. He founded the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK) in 1990 and was elected president of the Republic of Kosovo in 1992.
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Dr. Rugova is extremely popular and his non-violent approach has won him attention
from world leaders. It is this peaceful approach that has provided him with an
international audience and a high level of respect from the international community.
Currently, Albania remains the only country that has officially recognized Kosovo's
independence.
It is Rugova' s goal, together with the LDK, to draw as much international
attention to the plight of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo as possible. It was in September
of 1991 that the former Albanian dominated Kosovo Assembly sponsored an unofficial
campaign to make Kosovo a sovereign and independent state. Apparently, the
majority of the voting conducted for this referendum on independence was done in
private homes to avoid Serbian police. The ethnic Albanians living in rural areas of
Kosovo did not share the same concerns as urban residents with regard to police
surveillance and this facilitated a slightly more public style of voting in the
countryside.
The second organized function was an election held in May of 1992 in an
effort to elect a new parliament and a president to represent their interests. Rugova
and the LDK were overwhelmingly swept into power as the new democratically
elected Kosovar leadership. There was no effort to monitor the elections by the
European community or the United Nations. 74 The Kosovars were hoping that an
independent international presence would discourage Serb efforts to disrupt the event.
74Charles J. Brown, "Keeping it Safe for Serbia," Freedom Review, Vol. 23, No. 25,
September-October, 1992, p. 24.
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A law had been established prior to the elections by the pre-election parliament in
exile and provided for the following:
The law guaranteed suffrage to all Kosovars eighteen or older, promised
a secret ballot, and outlined eligibility rules for candidates. It also
established independent electoral commissions to monitor voter
registration, ballot security, and vote tabulation. 75
Charles J. Brown, author of Keeping it Safe for Serbia, was present in Kosovo
during the elections and offered the following in his article: "In every precinct save
one, over ninety percent of those eligible voted." Brown goes on to relate that a
massive media presence helped to quell violence, but Serb security forces still
managed to harass voters and poll volunteers. The Serb police left Rugova alone and
chose to go after the lower level "lieutenants" of the underground movement. It
appears the Kosovars were prepared for the Serb harassment, as they shifted their
polling places to less public areas. This seems to be the primary method for doing
political business in Kosovo. The Kosovars avoid large public gatherings that would
be a lot more efficient, but clearly a lot less safe.
There were 490 candidates pursuing 130 seats for the underground parliament
and Ibrahim Rugova was uncontested in his bid for the presidency in 1992. 76 The
LDK won a majority with 96 seats during this election. The Parliamentary Party
originally won 13 seats and have recently increased this number, the Peasant and





1 seat, there were 2 seats that went to independent candidates, and finally 14 seats
were reserved for Serbs.
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Naturally, the Serb authorities in Kosovo refused to
recognize the elections as legal and have continued to maintain the view that all
legitimate political power stems from Belgrade.
President Ibrahim Rugova represents only one of the many competing Albanian
political parties that comprise the parliament and underground government. Rugova'
s
party, the Democratic League of Kosovo, has traditionally expressed staunch support
of the movement for an independent Kosovo. The LDK rejected a March 1997 offer
to discuss Kosovar autonomy within Serbia. This offer originated with Slobodan
Milosevic's Zajedno opposition. Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister and a close associate
of Rugova, represents the Republic of Kosovo on the international scene and
personally rejected the Serb opposition's offer. Recently, frustrated Kosovars have
shifted some allegiance to the largest minority opposition to the LDK, the
Parliamentary Party.
2. Kosovar Political Parties (Minority)
There is an array of political parties that also represent ethnic Albanian interests
in the Kosovar parliament. These organizations are important, as they demonstrate an
expansion in the overall participation of ethnic Albanians in political events. However,
they also indicate that the Albanian opposition is somewhat fractured with a number of
77Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 7 June 1992 trans, in FBIS-EEU-92-
110, 8 June 1992, p. 57, quoted by Elez Biberaj, "Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg,"
Conflict Studies 258, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, The
United Kingdom, February 1993, p. 3.
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viewpoints on Kosovo's future. A divergence of opinion could serve to weaken the
Kosovar efforts which could in turn lead to a breakdown in the governing apparatus.
The aforementioned development of smaller political parties and action groups
is a clear indication of the frustration that exists in the region. The lack of progress
toward a better livelihood has driven some Kosovars to shift their loyalty to other
organizations. Additionally, the underground parliamentary leadership representing
Kosovar interests has begun to question and even alter their demands. The
Parliamentary Party (PPK) under the leadership of Adem Demaci represents the most
extreme shift in Kosovar demands.
a. The Parliamentary Party (PPK)
The Parliamentary Party (PPK) is led by human rights activist, Adem
Demaci. Mr. Demaci is often referred to as the "Albanian Nelson Mandela." This
individual spent over 28 years in prison before his 1990 release. 78 Adem Demaci and
his party now control about 57 of the 130 seats in parliament. His political goal in the
future is to pursue the presidential position that now belongs to Rugova. An additional
9 seats for a total of 66 would allow Demaci to achieve his presidential ambition.
The Parliamentary Party differs from the Democratic League of Kosovo
because it has recently advocated accepting less then an independent republic.
Specifically, Kosovo would essentially have the same status as Montenegro.
Montenegro has its own constitution and is supposed to be an equal member of the
78 Fabian Schmidt, "Protests in Serbia Raise Hopes of Reconciliation in Kosovo,"
Transition, Vol. 3, No. 4., March 7, 1997.
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). However, Milosevic's Serbia has a substantial
degree of power over Montenegro that isn't found in any of the three existing
constitutions. Furthermore, Demaci has expressed strong opposition to any plan that
calls for a return to the autonomous status Kosovo enjoyed under the 1974
constitution. It is quite likely that Kosovo, as an "equal" republic within the FRY,
would not be entirely free of Serb dominance. This absence of Kosovar independence
makes the Demaci plan a little hard to swallow.
It is important to emphasize that Demaci is an individual with a strong
personal desire to replace Ibrahim Rugova. He has firmly criticized Rugova and his
policies, but does not appear to be able to offer an acceptable replacement. His
controversial Balkania (Kosovo's association with Montenegro and Serbia) solution for
the region has received strong criticism from his own Parliamentary Party and other
political organizations in Kosovo.
b. The Albanian Christian Democratic Party (PSHDK)
The Albanian Christian Democratic Party (PSHDK) is led by Dr.
Krasniqi and Tadej Rodiqi. Krasniqi is a well-respected leader in Kosovo and appears
to be increasing his personal political power base. The PSHDK holds the 1991
referendum on Kosovar independence and sovereignty sacred. This organization feels
strongly that the 1991 legislation is the only mandate that Kosovar leaders have with
which to govern the Republic of Kosovo. 79 Furthermore, Krasniqi is against the
79Kosova Information Center, "Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania,
Demaci says," No. 1 109, April 3, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report. August 31, 1997.
Available http: //www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-04-03.ksv.html
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independent action of individuals attempting to arrange secret meetings to further
political goals.
80
Krasniqi has been outspoken on a host of issues relating to the plight of
Albanians in the Balkans, but he has not been able to win more than three percent of
the vote. The PSHDK condemned the Macedonian Special Police for instituting a
campaign of vandalism directed against the Albanian population in Macedonia. 81
Krasniqi and the PSHDK feel that the greatest point of departure amongst the Albanian
political parties is the referendum of the people, as a sanctified act of democratic
expression. 82 Finally, the vocal PSHDK leader reiterated his unswerving position on
Kosovo's independence during a Pristina press conference this summer. Dr. Krasniqi
has stated that any arrangement within Serbia or the FRY is unacceptable.
c. The Social Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSDK)
The Social Democratic Party of Kosovo is currently led by Luljeta Pula
-Beqiri and Dr. Besim Bokshi. The PSDK is composed of two factions and has
80Kosovo Information Center, "Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania,
Demaci says." It is important to note that there is a host of smaller political parties not
included in this discussion. These organizations are in the development stage and
include, but are not limited to, the Albanian National Democratic Party (PNDSH), the
National Unity Party (UNIKOMB), and the Peasants Party of Kosova (PFK). Although
certainly important in expressing Kosovar interests, these parties are not well established
and have little or no representation in the underground parliament.
8
'Kosovo Information Center, "Kosovar Political Parties Denounce FYROM
Crackdown on Albanians," No. 1181, July 10, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report.
August 31, 1997. Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-07-10.ksv.html
82Kosovo Information Center, "Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania,
Demaci says."
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expressed dismay with the international community's reluctance to recognize Kosovo
as an independent republic. The Kosovo Information Center (KIC) reported that Pula-
Beqiri had expressed concern and criticized U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John
Kornblum in a formal letter written earlier this year. It appears that Pula-Beqiri was
reacting to a Kornblum statement that Kosovo must seek the solution to its problems
through Serbia. Additionally, this party strongly opposed the June 1997 elections in
neighboring Albania. Specifically, the PSDK considered the elections: "Neither free,
nor fair, nor acceptable/' 83 This criticism of the new Albanian government conflicts
directly with the praise and congratulatory remarks that were offered by Ibrahim
Rugova and the LDK. Additionally, the criticism is indicative of the increasing
divisions within the Kosovar opposition and the expression of a mixed message.
d. The Liberal Party of Kosovo (PLK)
Gjergj Dedaj represents the Liberal Party of Kosovo (PLK) which is an
organization that stands for an independent and neutral Kosovo. The PLK shares the
same concerns regarding the 1991 referendum on independence as the PSHDK and
other Kosovar political parties. Mr. Dedaj staunchly opposes the "Balkania" plan that
PPK leader Adem Demaci has tried to market throughout the region. Furthermore, he
has related that neutral status is a compromise. 84 This particular arrangement would
83Kosovo Information Center, "PSDK Calls Election in Albanian Neither Free, Nor
Fair, Nor Acceptable," No. 1177, July 4, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report. August
31, 1997. Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-07-04.ksv.html
84Kosovo Information Center, "Independence and Neutrality, the Only Viable Solution
for Kosova. PLK Leader says, No. 1089, June 3, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report.
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allow Kosovo to be open to both Serbia and Albania for diplomatic relations in the
future.
The PLK has shown particular sensitivity toward relations with Albania.
Dedaj views Kosovo as under occupation by the Milosevic regime and he is
determined in his efforts to convey this message to both Belgrade and Tirana. The
PLK and other Kosovar political parties are concerned with the change of command in
Albania. Sali Berisha, a "Gheg" and the former President of Albania, was courted by
the Kosovars as a sympathetic ally.
3. The Parliament, Passive Resistance, and Frustration
The inability to convene their parliament in mass, the absence of large scale
tangible international support, and a dual party structure with differing goals has
served to weaken the Albanians' effort against Belgrade. However, Ibrahim Rugova
continues to lobby the United States and Western European countries for support. The
U.S. State Department opened an Information Center in Kosovo, but it is very limited
in its diplomatic functions. Furthermore, the U.S. Charge d' Affaires in Belgrade has
informed Rugova that the U.S. does not support independence. Additionally, Sali
Berisha' s Albanian government was the only institution in the international community
to actually recognize Kosovo's "underground state." Western countries may fear a
repeat of the recent Balkan hostilities that commenced shortly after international
recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia.
The underground parliament was due for an election in May of this year, but
all elections were postponed by Rugova until December of 1997. Despite
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overwhelming support for Rugova, the opposition to him views the postponement of
elections as a plot on behalf of the President to stay in power. The reason for the
postponement of the parliamentary elections was rather vague, but it appears that de-
confliction with scheduled elections in Serbia was paramount in Rugova' s decision. 85
The fall elections may change the Kosovar opposition's approach from the Rugova-led
independence movement to settling for a Demaci-sponsored "Balkania" plan. The
opposing views of Kosovar leadership, as alluded to above, have not made for the
most effective resistance to the Serbs. The Rugova government's concept of peaceful
resistance to Serb domination has produced almost no visible results for Albanians.
In a recent interview with Ibrahim Rugova, Timothy Ash discussed at great
length the increasing ethnic Albanian frustration with the shadow state. Rugova
related that the Albanian parliament had worked to set up an independent university
and a health care organization named after Mother Theresa, an ethnic Albanian born in
Macedonia. 86 Although, more than eighteen thousand school teachers are currently
funded by dues that are paid to the underground regime, these dues are paid in
addition to the normal Serb government taxes. There is some international relief as
suggested by the Kosovo Information Center, but double taxation imparts additional
hardship on an already fatigued and impoverished Albanian population. This tired
85Kosovo Information Center, "Summary from President Rugova' s Press Conference,"
No. 1137, May 9, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report
.
86Timothy Garton Ash, "In the Serbian Soup," The New York Review ofBooks, Vol.
44, No. 7, April 24, 1997, p. 28.
47
Kosovar population is keenly aware that it has been almost six years since Rugova
came to power and there is still no significant change in their status.
The former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, Mr. Warren Zimmerman, was
quoted as saying: "Kosovo has not exploded, which was something analysts expected
in the late 80' s and early 90' s, owing to the passive (unarmed) resistance the Kosovo
Albanians have pursued." 5 However, Kosovos' Albanians have become frustrated
with the perceived lack of progress and some have abandoned the practice of peaceful
resistance.
The Ghandi-style methods of resistance applied in public by the
Albanian separatist movement have not resulted in a strong enough
internationalization of the Kosovo issue, so that also terrorism is
growing roots in Kosovo and Metohija, as an often resorted to means of
political struggle in the so-called hopeless situations. 88
B. THE ARMED ETHNIC ALBANIAN OPPOSITION
The shift from civil disobedience to the use of terrorism as a means of
expression is indicative of Kosovar impatience with their predicament. The Liberation
Army of Kosovo (UCK) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo
(LKCK) surfaced in the spring of 1 996 with a series of brutal attacks on Serb officials.
These organizations offer an alternative for those tired of Rugova' s policies. The
terrorist attacks have been extremely effective in capturing international attention. The
87Kosovo Information Center, "Passive Resistance of Albanians Has Prevented
Kosova from Exploding, Zimmerman Says," No. 839, March 21, 1996. Online. Kosovo
Daily Report. Available http://kosova@gn.apc.org
88
Milivoje Mihajlovic, "Kosovo Today," Serbia Bulletin, September 1996. Online.
No date. Available http://www.yugoslavia.com
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global news networks do not seem to report the extensive political maneuvering
associated with the movement, as much as the terrorist activities executed by the UCK.
The strategy of the Liberation Army of Kosovo does not appear much different from
that employed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
Unfortunately, there is not a lot of information available regarding the structure
of this terrorist group. However, the tactics and doctrine of this organization can be
traced through an examination of the many violent anti-Serb acts that have become
increasingly common. Members of the UCK are most likely experienced military
personnel that have received some type of professional training. It is important to note
that a significant level of progression appears evident in the Kosovar terrorist
movement. The sophistication of explosive devices utilized have evolved to the point
where remote detonation is now possible. The frequency of the attacks and total
number killed has more than doubled after one year of "visible" existence.
Additionally, the targets have broadened from Serb authorities to ethnic Albanians
perceived as collaborators. This progression marks an escalation in violence not seen
in recent years and could spark the end of peaceful resistance.
Ibrahim Rugova and the ethnic Albanian leadership have tried to distance
themselves as much as possible from terrorism, but do not appear to openly condemn
the violent action that has been taken in recent years. 89 Rugova fears losing
international respect by being associated with terrorists and blames Serb authorities for
89
Mihajlovic, "Kosovo Today," Online.
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staging the attacks. However, it is rather unlikely that the UCK and LKCK are Serb
efforts to foul the opposition in their effort to gain control in Kosovo.
1. The Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK)
The Liberation Army of Kosovo first emerged in February of 1996 with a
series of bomb attacks on selected Serb targets. These targets were rather random at
first, but it appears that they centered on the homes of Serb refugees, automobiles, and
government facilities. Traditionally, the group has utilized small arms to include
automatic weapons and hand grenades. 90 The stated goal of the group has been strict
independence for Kosovo through the aggravation of regional tension. 91
It was by the Spring of 1996 that the UCK began to pursue a more lethal
approach with Serb policemen as their primary target. In the month of April the UCK
killed four people outside an open cafe by spraying the area with automatic weapons
fire. This incident occurred approximately sixty miles west of Pristina at a restaurant
frequented by Serb authorities. 92 An array of arrests followed the wave of terrorism,
but violent incidents continued rather unimpeded throughout the year. The arrests did
not deter or prevent ethnic Albanians from using terrorism in Kosovo in their struggle
against Serb dominance. The typical Serb response to the terrorist actions has been to
90Fabian Schmidt, "Mysterious Kosovo Liberation Army on Still on the Move," No.
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crack down on the ethnic Albanian population with public trials for the alleged
terrorists. The defense lawyers for individuals on trial often claim that their clients
were physically tortured into confessing involvement with terrorism.
The Kosovo Liberation Army claimed responsibility for killing a civilian and a
Serb policeman near the village of Podujevo in October of 1996. It has become
evident that the most common way for the UCK to claim responsibility for such acts is
by faxing messages to the media for broadcast on the local news. 93 However, there
appears to be some reluctance by the Albanian press to report on the UCK. Ethnic
Albanian leaders have felt that international condemnation of terrorism has the
potential to adversely effect the entire opposition movement. Rugova has repeatedly
stated his distaste for terrorism and declared his commitment to peaceful resistance.
Apparently, the communiques claiming responsibility for the attacks were sent through
the Swiss Confederation. 94 An Italian journalist, Alberto Negri, interviewed a Kosovo
Liberation Army spokesman in Tirana, Albania. The individual related the specifics
on how the UCK communicates with the outside world from its secret Pristina
headquarters. Additionally, this UCK spokesman showed the Italian journalist a copy
of the clandestine newspaper known as "Clirimi" or "freedom."
93Kosovo Information Center, "UCK Claims Responsibility for Killings, Serb
Paramilitary Organization Threatens to Hit Back," No. 1056, January 21, 1997. Online.
Kosovo Daily Report. August 31, 1997. Available http://www.hri.org/ news/ balkans/
kosova/97-0 1 -2 1 /ksv.html
94Milan II Sole-24 Ore (Italian), February 13, 1997, p. 3, trans in FBIS-TOT-97-021-
L, February 27, 1997.
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The murders of several individuals in early January of 1997 exemplified a
change in UCK tactics. Specifically, the targeted population was expanded to include
ethnic Albanians. Furthermore, the attacks were executed with a much higher degree
of sophistication. It was during this time that the UCK claimed responsibility for the
separate killings of two ethnic Albanian men who were alleged Serb loyalists. These
incidents were followed by an attack on the Serb rector of the University of Pristina. 95
The educator was not killed in this bomb attack that rocked the school's Serb
leadership, but the incident created a climate of fear that was unparalleled since the
birth of the opposition movement.
The car bomb was rather sophisticated, as it was remotely controlled to
detonate just as the vehicle passed the explosives. 96 This particular terrorist incident is
indicative of a much higher degree of training than the UCK previously displayed.
Although not as deadly as other UCK related actions, this startling event directed
international attention toward Kosovo. James Walsh in his article, "The Next Balkan
Crisis," offers the following regarding the incident.
If that was a UCK act, it raises the ante considerably, declared a
Western diplomat in Belgrade who pointed out that such provocations
could lead to martial law, the Yugoslav army activated, police
checkpoints, all of which could spillover to Macedonia with its own
Albanian minority. 97
95Gjeraqina Tuhina, "Out of the Shadows," War Report 49. Online. The Institutefor
War and Peace Reporting, 1997.
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97James Walsh, "The Next Balkan Crisis," Vol. 149, No. 8, February 24, 1997.
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In March of this year, OMRJ's Daily Digest reported that four people were
injured in the bombing of a Serbian monument to Serb language reformer Vuk
Karadzic near the university. Additionally, a Serb policemen was shot five times at a
restaurant cafe. The targeting of Pristina University and areas that contain Serbian
cultural monuments agitated Serb officials who have an overwhelming presence in
urban areas.
A series of killings during the month of April reinforced the belief that
terrorists would not hesitate to kill Kosovars that were thought to be collaborators.
The UCK claimed it killed Ramiz Leka, a Milosevic loyalist and an ethnic Albanian.
The killing of perceived Albanian collaborators by the UCK multiplied an already high
level of fear that continues to permeate the entire region.
In May, two Serb policemen were shot to death and one ethnic Albanian was
murdered in hostilities between the UCK and Serb officials. Additionally, an
extremely large mob of college students in Pristina staged a demonstration to protest
the arrest of alleged ethnic Albanian terrorists. The public outcry regarding the
incidents and subsequent arrests actually completes the UCK mission. Confusion that
has the potential to lead to a mobilization of the large ethnic Albanian population, is a
step toward success for the UCK.
Chris Hedges's New York Times article: "Resistance to Serbia Turns Violent in
Kosovo," is based primarily on an interview with an ethnic Albanian referred to as
"Alban," who claims to be a leader of the UCK. Hedges reports that the organization
receives political and financial support from the ethnic Albanian population.
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Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the UCK receives money and training
from Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. 98 UCK terrorists appear to be cautious in
selecting their targets and use more sophisticated means for which to kill these
QQ
targets.
Although certainly an overestimation of the armed opposition, Serb officials
believe that there may be as many as 40,000 Muslim terrorists who fought in Bosnia
and are now supporting the ethnic Albanian cause in Kosovo. 100 However, it is unclear
exactly which organization these Muslim volunteers may be serving and it is likely
that the Serb estimate has been inflated to some degree. Training and financial
support for these militant Islamic groups is expected to have originated in Pakistan or
possibly Iran. The increase in terrorist activity may be coupled with an increase in the
flow of arms into the region. The acquisition of weapons from Middle Eastern
countries during the recent conflict in neighboring Bosnia was largely restricted by the
International Community's sanctions. Nevertheless, it appears that weapons were able
to reach those warring factions seeking them. The aforementioned weapons
proliferation issue presents a threat to neighboring U.S. led NATO backed SFOR
currently stationed in the Balkans. The expansion of terrorist activity and the
98
"Hope, and Danger, for ethnic Albanians," The Economist, March 29, 1997.
99 Fabian Schmidt, "Kosovo Liberation Army Launches New Offensive," OMRI
Analytical Briefs, January 16, 1997, Vol. 1, No. 525. (http://www.omri.cz)
100Chris Hedges, "Resistance to Serbia Turns Violent in Kosovo," The New York
Times, February 17, 1997.
54
proliferation of weapons is a threat to the multinational force that is trying to keep the
peace in neighboring Bosnia.
2. The National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK)
The National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) is a small
organization that does not support Ibrahim Rugova's passive resistance movement.
Although this organization has taken a "back seat" to the aggressive Liberation Army
of Kosovo (UCK), it does exist and even publishes a bulletin. 101 This movement is
often confused with the UCK, but there does not appear to be an association with the
type of terrorism common to the Liberation Army of Kosovo.
Apparently, the LKCK believes that the only acceptable solution to the problem
is through a large-scale war with Serbia, as terrorism will not ensure freedom for
ethnic Albanians. 102 The LKCK appears to offer the extreme alternative to the Rugova
approach. This movement may have appeal with frustrated elements of the population
who are tired of the stagnant situation, but are opposed to the kind of terrorism
advocated by the UCK. The tumultuous history of this Balkan territory is indicative of
the challenge to security in the future. As alluded to earlier, violent protests and brutal
crackdowns have become common to everyday life for the Kosovars. Finally, the
LKCK is another example of the recent emergence of organizations that advocate
fighting Serb rule with force.
101Gjeraqina Tuhina, "Out of the Shadows," War Report 49. Online. The Institutefor
War and Peace Reporting, 1 997.
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V. KOSOVO AND PROSPECTS FOR CRISIS RESOLUTION
Even if all-out war does not break out, the future is bleak. Ironically, in
the wreckage of post-Tito Yugoslavia, it is the two peoples who loathed
each other most of all who are still condemned to live together within
the same state.
103
The conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is potentially lethal to
regional stability. In fact, this volatile situation has explosive possibilities for all of
Southeastern Europe. Specifically, ethnic violence originating in Kosovo has the
potential to involve ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Albania. An escalation in
violence could include U.S. forces deployed in Macedonia as part of a United Nations
Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) force. The spread of hostilities into the
aforementioned border states could result in the involvement of Greece, Turkey,
Romania, Hungary, and even Bulgaria.
There appears to be an increasing sense of dissatisfaction with the ruling parties
that currently control the former Communist Balkan states. Albanian and Serb leaders
have increasingly come under fire in the wake of deteriorating standards of living.
Anti-governmental protests have rocked both Belgrade and Tirana since the cessation
of hostilities in 1995. In general, the Serbian populace appears to be showing more
respect for human rights since the 1995 Dayton Accords. This shift in public opinion
could improve the chances for a resolution of the Kosovo issue. 104 However, strong
103Judah,p. 308.
104Fabian Schmidt, "Protests in Serbia Raise Hopes of Reconciliation in Kosovo,"
Transition, March 7, 1997, Vol. 3, No. 4, Open Media Research Institute, p. 18.
57
Serb sentiment regarding Kosovo cannot be underestimated in future mediation of the
conflict. Belgrade has maintained that Albanian separatism within the FRY remains an
unacceptable option.
There is an array of scenarios that must be examined when attempting to assess
the future of Kosovo. These include, but are not limited to, the following: the concept
of a greater Albania, an independent Kosovo, an intensified federalization of the FRY,
a reestablishment of autonomy, the partitioning of the province, ethnic war, and a
maintenance of the status quo. 105
A. KOSOVO, A GREATER ALBANIA, AND BALKAN BORDERS
The conflict in Kosovo has increasingly become a more visible issue in Albania
over the past six years. Milosevic's decision to withdraw Kosovo's autonomous status
in 1989 and the subsequent birth of the modern opposition movement sparked an
intense effort by Kosovars to obtain external support. The radical changes in the
region and the brutal warfare in other areas of the former Yugoslavia attracted
Albanian attention to the plight of the Kosovars. Recently, Albanian Foreign Minister
Paskal Milo related that, "Albania's government cannot negotiate in the name of
Kosova." 106 He also went on to say, "If the problem of Kosova is not resolved on a
realistic basis, there cannot be peace, understanding, and cooperation in the
105Stefan Troebst, "Still Looking for an Answer to The Albanian Question,"
Transition, Vol. 3, No. 4, March 7, 1997, Open Media Research Institute, p. 25.
106Kosovo Information Center, "Albania Cannot Negotiate in the Name of Kosova,"
No. 1234, September 18, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report . September 19, 1997.
Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-09-l 8.ksv.html
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Balkans." 107 Albania remains the only country to have formally recognized the self-
proclaimed Republic of Kosovo.
1. Kosovars and Albanian Unification
It was alluded to earlier that a movement for a greater Albania was never truly
initiated by Kosovars or Albanians. This is primarily because of the vast tribal,
linguistic, and religious differences that exist among Albanians who remain scattered
throughout the Balkans.
To most Albanians the concept of a Greater Albania, including Kosovo,
is a myth or a dream rather than a possible geographic reality. 108
There is a history of hostility between ethnic Albanians residing in Kosovo and
the multitude of powerful regimes that have governed Albania. Many Kosovars have
concluded that the former Albanian Communist government led by Enver Hoxha
essentially ignored the plight of ethnic Albanians in the region. It seems that it was
never really in the interest of Albania to exacerbate relations with Tito's Yugoslavia by
siding with the Kosovars.
Albania and Yugoslavia were major trading partners by the 1980's and there
was some Serb fear of an Albanian campaign for a greater Albania. 109 Additionally,
the political structures were quite different, which made unification rather unrealistic.
Most Kosovars were farmers and owned their own land. This contrasted with
107Kosovo Information Center, "Albania Cannot Negotiate in the Name of Kosova.
108Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania, New York University Press,




Albania's Stalinist program of collectivization." Clearly, it was economically
counterproductive for Albania to fight for Kosovar rights prior to 1989. However,
Hoxha's extreme distaste for Yugoslavia led to his desire to use the Kosovars to make
trouble for Tito.' 1 '
Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in 1989 changed the relationship between
Kosovo and Albania. The imposition of United Nations sanctions on Serbia was
detrimental to the free flow of trade between the former Yugoslavia and Albania.
Simultaneously, an unparalleled increase in human rights abuses directed against
Kosovars shocked the majority of Albanians. A more open Albania that was no longer
sheltered by Communism received reports of Milosevic's crack down on a regular
basis. Milosevic's actions forced Albania to pay closer attention to the situation in
Kosovo. Additionally, a few Albanian scholars saw the end of Communism and the
establishment of new governments as a chance to finally solve the issue of Albanian
nationalism.
Albanian leader Ramiz Alia, the successor to Enver Hoxha, ordered the
publication of pamphlets and other materials that outlined the plight of the Kosovars. 112
Alia responded expeditiously to the growing Albanian distaste for the problems in
Kosovo and tried to draw international attention to the Kosovars cause. Although
ll0Arshi Pipa, "The Political Situation Of The Albanians in Yugoslavia, With
Particular Attention to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach," East European





Albania recognized Kosovo, it appears that it was equally important for the survival of
an unstable Albania not to encite the Kosovars into an armed conflict.
Initially, the emergence of Sali Berisha as Albania's post-Cold War leader
provided the Kosovars with additional support from the Albanian government.
President Berisha was from Northern Albania and, like the Kosovars, he was a
Gheg. 113 Albania had undergone a tremendous political revolution, as the Communist
leaders had all been of Tosk heritage or from Southern Albania. " 4 Sali Berisha was
not unlike Alia in that he hoped to draw international attention to Kosovo and at the
same time attract funding for Albania. The Democratic League of Kosovo responded
with support for Berisha and the firm belief that a strong Albania was the secret to
their success.
Unfortunately, Albania's socio-economic situation was very difficult and the
Berisha regime was really in no position to offer any assistance except in the areas of
education and some military training. 115 Apparently there is evidence that some
Kosovars have been trained in guerilla tactics at Labinot in central Albania. 116
The execution of an Albanian unification plan would surely necessitate military
action by the formidable Serb armed forces. Albania remains ill-equipped to deal with








well-organized Albanian unification movement is ready to embark on such an
endeavor. Nevertheless, Ibrahim Rugova continues to court Albanian leadership
regardless of the ruling regime and Albania's deteriorating socio-economic situation.
He expressed hope for Kosovar-Albanian relations in congratulating President Rexhep
Mejdani and Speaker of the Parliament Skender Gjinushi on their recent victory. 117
Interestingly, other Kosovar political parties have expressed disgust with the elections
in Albania and have criticized the newly-elected leaders. Unlike his opposition,
Rugova appears to understand that Albania has an international voice that can be used
to attract external attention.
Apparently, most of the support for Albanian unification comes from Western
Europe and the United States.
The notion of a unified Albania has much more active support in New
York than it does in Albania. There are an estimated 350,000-400,000
Albanian-Americans, and the leaders of their various communities were
active in promoting the issue of Kosovo. 118
Traditionally, Albanians have crossed the border and moved into Kosovo to
visit with ethnic Albanian relatives. Until recently, it was widely believed that
Kosovars had a much higher standard of living. The repression that has occurred in
Kosovo since 1989 has reversed the migration trend. Kosovars are now moving into
Albania. An estimated 75,000 have crossed the border and as many as 500,000 could
117Kosovo Information Center, "President Rugova Congratulates New Albanian
Leaders, Mejdani and Gjinushi," No. 1193, July 25, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily
Report. Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-08-15.ksv.html
1 ' 8Vickers and Pettifer, p. 151.
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cross in the event of a large-scale war." 9 Albanians have received Kosovar refugees
with mixed feelings. There is a growing perception amongst Albanians that the
Kosovars are simply mafia-style criminals. However, it appears that the majority of
ethnic Albanians from Kosovo who have chosen to settle in Albania have for the most
part been aggressive in trying to establish economic security.
It is important to note that Albanians seem to fear a large-scale influx of
Kosovars, as they have their own challenges to overcome after a recent paralyzing
collapse of political and economic structures. This Albanian apprehension with regard
to the situation in Kosovo has been coupled with a certain lack of sympathy for the
quandary of the Kosovars. Albania has deployed forces to the Serb border along with
a more cautious approach to the situation in the former autonomous province.
2. Ethnic Albanians and Balkan Borders
United Nations sanctions implemented against Belgrade created an environment
for lucrative smuggling operations in the Southeastern Balkans. The borders of
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo are an especially sensitive issue, as
illegal cross-border trade provides support for the Kosovar economy. Serb border
guards routinely exchange gunfire with Albanians and Macedonians along the border.
This is a very serious issue as American forces are stationed along Macedonia's
northern boundary with Kosovo. There have been multiple border incidents that have
resulted in a number of deaths over the past several years. The border problem is
119VickersandPettifer, p. 156.
further exacerbated by Albanians from Montenegro who routinely smuggle goods
across Lake Shkoder. 120
Montenegro's Albanians comprise about 6 percent of the population and their
small numbers appear to keep them free of the conditions common to Kosovars. To
date, Albanians in Montenegro have not been repressed and controlled by authorities,
as it appears that they are much more integrated into the population. However, these
Albanians together with Montenegro's Muslim population from the Sandzak region are
for the most part against Serb policies (see figure 2). This situation has the potential
to be problematic in the future, should conditions continue to worsen in neighboring
Kosovo.
Unlike the Montenegrin police, the Macedonian police and security units have
cracked down on Kosovars transiting the border, which is seen as a threat to regional
stability. Macedonians have tried to restrict the free flow of goods across their
territory and are quite nervous about a potential shift in the demographic situation.
The majority of the ethnic Albanians traveling across the border are en route to visit
with Albanian relatives in northern Macedonia. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia
comprise almost thirty percent of the population and they do not face the same harsh
treatment that has become common to Kosovars. 121 However, human rights problems
are developing and recent incidents with the police appear to support this trend.
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Figure 2. The Sandzak and Albanian Majority Areas (From Ref. Susan L. Woodward,
Balkan Tragedy)
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Apparently, the police have handcuffed and beaten Kosovars before deporting
them. 122 Additionally, Macedonian Police clashed with violent ethnic Albanians after
the removal of Albanian and Turkish flags from municipal buildings in Tetovo and
Gostivar, Macedonia. The ethnic Albanians detained by police for alleged involvement
in the incidents claim that they were beaten and terrorized while in detention.
Although an effort has been made with some international support, Albania and
Macedonia do not have the infrastructure in place to effectively monitor their border
with Serbia. This has been proven with regard to the overall inability to effectively
enforce economic sanctions against Serbia. The loss of the Yugoslav market with the
imposition of sanctions was detrimental to the entire region as Balkan countries
struggled with reform. In general, these countries found that it was not always in their
best economic interests to enforce the United Nations sanctions.
In the end, the concept of a unified Albania in the Balkans remains unrealistic.
Albania would have to spearhead the effort and at present does not have the political,
economic, or military means with which to achieve such a goal. Moreover, the
Kosovo issue seems to materialize in Albania only during periods of domestic discord,
when politicians attempt to divert public attention. However, it is not unreasonable to
expect some kind of Albanian military response in the wake of large-scale violence in
Kosovo. The fragile Albanian military is undergoing re-development as part of an
agreement with NATO to help rebuild its defense establishment. Albania is currently
122Kosovo Information Center, "FYROM Police Ill-treat Kosova Albanians," No.
1193, July 25, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report. August 31, 1997. Available
http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-07-25.ksv.html
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a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and has entered defense agreements
with Turkey. Although unification with Albania would certainly mark an
improvement in their current status, the majority of Kosovars continue to pursue
independence. Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that Macedonia or Serbia would
willingly surrender any territory that would allow for such a unification.
B. AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO
An independent Kosovo has been the goal of the majority of Kosovars since
the establishment of the League of Prizren in the late 1880's. The 1968 Belgrade
rejection of a petition for status as a republic resulted in unprecedented freedoms for
Kosovo. Although the petition was refused, the Kosovars earned the right to display
the Albanian flag, speak the Albanian language, and maintain their own education
system.
123 The revocation of autonomy in 1989 was the impetus for the most
organized modern crusade for independence. Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK), as the party in power, have led ethnic Albanians toward this goal over
the past six years.
Under a plan that would provide for independence, Kosovo would be allowed
to secede from Serbia (FRY), much as Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-
Hercegovina seceded from Yugoslavia. Unfortunately for ethnic Albanians living in
Kosovo, Serb domination over the region remains an overwhelming obstacle to
secession.
123Arshi Pipa, "The Political Situation of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, With Particular
Attention to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach," p. 162.
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They [Serbs] argue that the Albanians are not a people with a right to
self-determination [i.e., such as the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina], but a mere national minority within Serbia. 124
Independence for Kosovo is impossible without sufficient support from the
international community. It was stated earlier, that Albania has been the only country
to actually recognize the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. Over the past several
years it has become evident that the international community was ill-prepared to deal
with the break-up of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, the absence of a common approach
to the situation reflected negatively on the crisis. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords
were the most productive international mediation, but they failed to address the
conflict in Kosovo. To date, the United States and the European Union only support a
restoration of autonomy as outlined by the 1974 constitution.
It is almost certain that any Kosovar attempt to secede from Serbia would
provoke a large scale military response from Belgrade. 125 This type of military
intervention is precisely what the United States has warned Serbia not to undertake.
C. INTENSIFIED FEDERALIZATION
An option that has been described as the Kosovar' s second best solution for the
future of Kosovo is that of a republic inside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY). Adem Demaci, the controversial leader of the Parliamentary Party (PPK) has
!24Steven Woehrel, "Kosovo: The Next Post-Yugoslav Crisis?" CRS Reportfor
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Figure 3. Intensified Federalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (From Ref.
Central Intelligence Agency Map, Serbia-Montenegro)
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been the biggest supporter of this plan, which has increasingly been criticized within
the Kosovar opposition.
This option would allow Serbia to maintain her current borders and much of
the governing structure that has been established since the collapse of Yugoslavia.
However, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) would become known as
"Balkania" and would grant unprecedented freedom to Kosovars, Montenegrins,
Hungarians in Vojvodina, and Muslims in the Sandzak region. 126 This would
effectively end total Serb control over territory that is now considered Serbia-
Montenegro, as a part of the FRY. Serbia would have the same status as four other
"republics" within Balkania. In addition to Serbia, these "republics" would include
Sandzak, Montenegro, and the former autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo
(see figure 3).
Demaci has related that Balkania is his political project and he will do
everything to see it come true. 127 He has also indicated that he is ready to part
company with the Parliamentary Party over this issue. The opposition's argument
against "Balkania" is centered on the idea that the plan simply facilitates a greater
Serbia. This view is countered by Demaci who relates that the plan is for a
confederation and not a federation. Nevertheless, the Balkania concept runs counter to
the strong Serb nationalism that has fought desperately to maintain control over the
126
Troebst, p. 26.
127Kosovo Information Center, "Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania," No.
1109, April 3, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report. August 31, 1997. Available
http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-04-03.ksv.html
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territories of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the inability of the Kosovar opposition
to tolerate any option other than independence significantly hampers Balkania's
chances for success.
D. AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE
One solution that has been proposed for Kosovo includes the restoration of the
autonomous status that the province enjoyed prior to revocation in 1989. Tito's new
Yugoslav Constitution outlined autonomy for Kosovo in 1974 and it is this status that
the international community has been most inclined to support.
The constitution that was developed in 1974 provided for eight federal units.
These federal units included two provinces and six republics. The provinces,
Vojvodina and Kosovo, were granted the same governing apparatus as the six
republics. This structure included, but was not limited to, a Presidency, Government,
Parliament, Constitution, and a Constitutional Court. 128 Additionally, Kosovo
maintained representation in the Yugoslav Federal Government in Belgrade.
Essentially, the only significant difference between the republics and an autonomous
province was that the 1974 constitution provided the republics with right of
secession. 129
Autonomy for Kosovo ended in the spring of 1989, after Belgrade's declaration
of a state of emergency in the province. Slobodan Milosevic had concluded that the
128Muhamedin Kullashi, "Kosovo and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia," Balkan




elimination of autonomy in Kosovo was critical to his struggle for control over the
Yugoslav republics.
By abolishing the autonomy of both provinces of Vojvodina and
Kosovo, Serbia would directly control three-out-of eight votes in the
Federal Presidency - in comparison with the other republics that had one
vote each. That meant turning Yugoslavia into Serbo-slavia. 130
Milosevic manipulated the situation in Kosovo through purges and strong-arm tactics.
It was after the successful dismissal of the Party apparatus in Kosovo and Vojvodina
that his command over the region began to solidify. The federal parliament embraced
a series of amendments which resulted in a new Serb-dominated constitution.
Milosevic's control over the Kosovo assembly ensured passage of the new constitution.
It was in the adoption of this constitution that Kosovo had essentially voted to revoke
its own autonomy.
Towards the end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's the
Serbian Regime undertook "radical surgery" in Kosovo following the
abolishment of autonomy - an act of violence which had no grounds in
either the Serbian or the Federal Constitution - thus removing the
Albanians as "foreign elements" from all institutions. 131
The shocking actions of the Milosevic regime were met with condemnation by
elements of the international community. The European Parliament passed a
resolution declaring Belgrade's actions in Kosovo arbitrary and illegal. 132
130






It is important to note that the restoration of autonomy to Kosovo would most
likely improve Belgrade's standing with the international community. Currently, an
outer layer of sanctions remains wrapped around Serbia for an array of policies that
the international community finds unacceptable. Serb action on the Kosovo issue is a
prerequisite for the lifting of these sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Madeline
Albright has stated that unless there is real progress on the Kosovo issue the outer wall
of sanctions in place against the Serbs will not be removed. Additionally, Belgrade
must cooperate with the prosecution of war criminals at the Hague Tribunal if it
expects any serious international recognition. The sanctions have prevented the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from joining international organizations such as
the United Nations. They also forbid access to international financial institutions such
as the World Bank and the IMF. 133
At the time of this writing, Kosovars and Serbs are both adamantly opposed to
autonomy for Kosovo. The leaders of Kosovo's shadow state have related that they
could never support a mere restoration of autonomy for Kosovo. They believe Serbia
would revoke it again at the first opportunity. 134 Furthermore, the region has changed
tremendously over the past ten years and these changes hinder the reestablishment of
the type of autonomy common under the old system. The former republics of Tito's
Yugoslavia have achieved independence through international recognition. Bosnia,
133Kosovo Information Center, "Richard Miles: Outer Wall of Sanctions on Belgrade
Remains," No. 1080, February, 21, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report. August 31,
1 997. Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-02-2 1 .ksv.html
,34Steven Woehrel, p. 4.
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Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia are no longer available to offset Serbia's power.
Autonomy would now have to exist only under Serbia and not under the Yugoslavia of
yesteryear.
Organizations such as the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights have
supported a return to autonomy and have also offered alternatives in the event Serbia
should refuse such a request. One alternative that has been suggested is that of a
Trusteeship for Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council would call on Serbia to
place Kosovo under a Trusteeship that is administered by Articles 75-91 of the U.N.
Charter. 135
The trust territory of Kosovo would be administered by the United
Nations acting through the Trusteeship Council in a manner agreed to
by the concerned parties. In addition, Kosovo could be designated a
strategic area under the direct jurisdiction of the Security Council. 136
Basically, Kosovo would operate as an autonomous province for a designated period,
allowing international mediators the opportunity to design a long term solution to the
crisis. In the event that Serbia expresses its opposition to placing Kosovo under a
United Nations Trusteeship, a U.N. safe-haven status remains an unlikely, but potential
option. 137
In truth, it is extremely difficult to envision Serbia granting autonomy, a U.N.
Trusteeship, or safe-haven status for Kosovo. Serb intransigence is further






complicated by the Kosovar refusal to support anything less than independence.
Adem Demaci, the leader of the second most powerful party amongst the Kosovar
opposition has been ostracized for the introduction of more modest options such as
those alluded to above.
E. ETHNIC DIVISION
Although extremely unlikely, the Serbs and Albanians view the division of
Kosovo along ethnic, religious, historical, or economic lines as a possible option in
lieu of total control over the province. 138 In addition to Kosovo's sacred significance,
the reliance of Serbia on the province for natural resources complicates any effort to
divide Kosovo along ethnic lines.
A study conducted by Belgrade University's Mining and Geological School has
indicated that Kosovo has one of the largest coal basins in Europe. 139 Apparently, the
region has a reserve of almost 13.2 billion tons of coal with an estimated value of
$125 billion. 140 Unfortunately, a situation similar to that of Bosnia-Hercegovina might
result, as Albanians and Serbs wrestle for control over key assets and installations
within the province. It is important to note that there is an array of different proposals
for the ethnic division of Kosovo. The most probable scenario would include a
Kosovo, in which the Serb population would control territory of economic and
138
Troebst, p. 26.
139Kosovo Information Center, "Coal Reserves in Kosova Worth at Least USD 125
Billion, Serb Experts Say," No. 1067, February 4, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report.






YEAR TOTAL ALBANIAN SERB OTHER
NUMBER % % %
1913 497,456
1921 439,010 66.0 26.0 8.0





1981 1,588,400 77.0 13.0 10.0
1991* 2,000,000 90.0 8.0 2.0
Source: Musa Limani, The Geographic Position, Natural Riches, Demographic
Characteristics, and the Economical Development of Kosovo, Pristina, Kosovo: The
Association of Lawyers, 1992.
The data for 1991 is estimated, the census of that year was boycotted by the Albanian




COMMUNE TOTAL ALBANIANS SERBS
KOSOVO 1,584,558 1,227,424 209,792
DECANI 40,661 39,195 247
DRAGASHI 34,894 18,582 88
FERJZAJI 113,935 90,645 18,642
GJAKOVA 92,091 87,448 1,936
GJILANI 84,196 59,802 19,339
GLLOGOVCI 40,522 40,443 35
ISTOGU 50,011 35,806 7,728
KACANIKU 31,075 30,393 310
KAMENICA 48,216 32,352 14,759
KLINA 54,449 45,418 6,878
LEPOSAVIQI 16,941 853 15,035
LIPJANI 60,094 43,110 10,297
MITROVICA 105,097 66,618 25,867
PEJA 111,067 79,793 8,037
PODUJEVA 75,320 72,089 2,226
PRISHTINA 211,156 140,907 44,227
PRIZENI 134,689 93,902 11,671
RAHOVECI 61,048 56,208 4,039
SERBICA 46,907 45,467 1,116
SUHAREKA 59,406 55,663 3,581
VITIA 47,112 35,234 7,576

























Source: Peter Prifti, "Kosova's Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Pipa and
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religious interest. It has been estimated that this sub-divisioning of the province would
include almost forty percent of Kosovo. 141 According to 1981 figures, Serbs are most
prevalent in the northernmost sections of Kosovo (see table 2).
142 As stated earlier,
ethnic Albanians comprise ninety percent of the almost two million inhabitants and
they are rapidly expanding into areas traditionally dominated by Serbs. Belgrade has
tried to halt Serb migration out of Kosovo by restricting the sale of Serb real estate.
A territorial division is further complicated by the existence of Serb enclaves and
cultural monuments that are scattered throughout Kosovo (see figure 4).
Critical to an examination of the potential ethnic division of Kosovo is the shift
in demographics and the Serb effort to reverse this trend. As remarked upon earlier,
in the recent round of Serb nationalism fostered by Slobodan Milosevic the rights and
liberties of the majority of the population in Kosovo were revoked. The Serbs view
the Kosovars as simply a minority within Serbia. This view is fraught with danger for
Kosovo's future. Dusan Janjic, author of National Identities, Movements and
Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians, has referred to the Serb program in Kosovo as a
program of war. 143 Unfortunately for the Serb minority in the province, Kosovo
essentially became a republic as a result of the autonomous status that it was afforded
141Dusan Janjic, "National Identities, Movements and Nationalism of Serbs and
Albanians," Balkan Forum, Vol. 3, No. 1, December 1994, p. 57.
142
Peter Prifti, "Kosova's Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Arshi Pipa and Sami
Repishti (eds.), Studies on Kosova, Columbia University Press, 198, p. 159. It is
important to note that ethnic Albanians have boycotted post- 1 98 1 attempts by Belgrade




under the 1974 constitution. This appears to have been a key turning point in the
demographic history of the region, as the ethnic Albanian population became the
majority in an autonomous Kosovo rather than a minority in Serbia (see table 1).
Janjic points out the danger of repressing the ethnic Albanian majority in an
effort to reverse Kosovar dominance. Additionally, ethnic Albanian control in an
autonomous Kosovo has reinforced the belief that Albania is the only nation in Europe
divided by international borders. 144 It is clear that any future attempt to divide Kosovo
along ethnic lines has explosive potential for the entire region and could lead to an
expanded ethnic war.
F. ETHNIC WARFARE IN THE BALKANS
Sadly, ethnic warfare has ripped through the Balkans, destroying lives and
causing untold physical damage. Ethnic violence in Kosovo is currently ongoing and
could very well expand to cause a much larger regional conflict. This type of conflict
would most likely have the same bloody characteristics as the recent hostilities in
Bosnia or the First and Second Balkan Wars fought prior to World War I.
Obviously, a move for independence in Kosovo that would result in ethnic
warfare would not be in the best interest of many bordering countries in the region.
Many of Kosovo's neighbors have large populations of ethnic Albanians who are
sympathetic to the Kosovars. At this time, there is nothing to prevent these Albanians




Macedonia and Greece are not in favor of an independent Kosovo, as they fear that
their own Albanian populations may seek to unify for a greater Albania. 145
The titular nation of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian
community of Macedonia no doubt would be polarized, radicalized, and
ultimately mobilized to such a degree that direct involvement and even
intervention could not be excluded. 146
As referred to earlier, a war in Kosovo would most likely drive hundreds of
thousands of Albanian refugees out of the province. These refugees would flow into
neighboring Balkan states that are currently not able to accommodate them. Such a
shift in regional demographics would result in ethnic violence involving Turkish and
Albanian minorities in Macedonia. This type of ethnic violence would most likely
involve Turkey, Albania, Greece, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is within these
countries that Kosovars have recently sought refuge. Furthermore, Balkan states also
have a direct interest in protecting their respective minorities in the region.
Border guards at the Romanian checkpoint of Calafat in 1993 said that
an estimated 80,000 Kosovo Albanians had passed through in a year.
The Kosovo Albanians consistently described themselves as tourists but
the buses in which they traveled generally came back empty. Most of
the tourists were single males between the ages of 1 8 and 20 anxious to
avoid being drafted by the Serbian army. Having traveled through
Romania these people would typically go to Hungary and the Czech
Republic before crossing illegally into Germany. 147
145Milo Paskal, "The Albanian Question within the Current Context of the Balkan
Crisis," Balkan Forum, Vol. 3, No. 1 , March 1 995, p. 1 28.
146
Troebst, p. 27.
147Owen Bennett Jones, "Albanians in Kosovo: Prospects for the Future," Writenet,
October 1994. Online. Available http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/countty/writenet/
wriyug.htm
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A Fourth Balkan War as outlined above would present major problems for
NATO. A conflict involving Greece and Turkey has the potential to split the alliance.
United States involvement is also quite likely in a Balkan war, should ethnic violence
spread throughout the region. U.S. forces continue to patrol the Macedonian border
and are heavily involved in SFOR operations in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Moreover, two
U.S. administrations have threatened military action should the Serbs attack ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo.
It is possible that a major ethnic war in the Balkans is avoidable. Although a
conflict ignited in Kosovo may distract Serbs from domestic issues, it would harm
Serbia economically and internationally. However, prospects for the continuation of a
relatively stable status quo are diminishing as the Kosovars alter their approach to
resistance.
G. STATUS QUO
The pressure continues to build in Kosovo, as the Serbs remain steadfast in their
domination over the region. The Kosovars are equally dedicated to their goal of
independence, and the expanding communication gap between the two sides may prove
fatal to Kosovo's future. Economic hardship coupled with a distinct shift in the strategy
of the Kosovar opposition may make the status quo much more difficult to maintain.
Each of the parties in the Kosovo drama has its own arguments which





Kosovo is going nowhere as far as economic growth and development are
concerned. The absence of international financial and political support has restricted
progress tremendously for all of Serbia. A serious imbalance is possible as Kosovo's
Balkan neighbors continue to develop while Kosovo remains stagnant and
unproductive under Serb repression. This scenario is not just bad for Kosovo, but it is
also very bad for Serbia, as the outer wall of sanctions continues to restrict progress in
Serbia.
Milosevic's policies may be contrasted with those of other former Yugoslav
republics Slovenia and Croatia. These former republics have fostered a positive
relationship with the international community and this has paved the way for
development, politically, economically, and militarily. Slobodan Milosevic, the so-
called master of Balkan politics, appears to be slowly destroying both Serbia and
Kosovo with his repressive policies. Milosevic is not alone in creating an explosive
environment that threatens Balkan stability. Essential to an easing of tensions in
Kosovo is for the ethnic Albanians to recognize that the problem is not simply
Albanian. 149 The cultural significance of Kosovo coupled with Belgrade's concern for
the Serb minority are immense barriers to effective conflict resolution.
The parallel system that has developed under the Kosovar opposition has
actually reduced the communication between the two sides, making cooperation even
more of a challenge. The two sides have drifted further apart in recent years. The




be achieving some degree of permanence. Aside from financial cooperation, the need
for a Serb contribution in Kosovo continues to diminish with time.
It is quite possible that stagnant conditions in Kosovo could prevail for many
years. However, as alluded to earlier, the chances are less likely for peaceful
coexistence as Kosovars shift their opposition tactics from passive resistance to
violence through terrorism. The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) is
the foremost example of the aforementioned phenomenon. Violence has escalated with
the increased action of the UCK and this does not bode well for the prevention of
ethnic war. Additionally, protests are getting harder for Ibrahim Rugova to control.
Recently, Rugova told university students to hold off planned protests on failed
education accords. His request stemmed from a renewed effort to address the issue
with Serb leaders. The students protested despite Rugova' s request and Serb riot
police responded with tear gas. This lack of control on the part of the opposition's
leadership is particularly dangerous for the already strained relationship between
Kosovars and Serbs. It is the younger and more radical ethnic Albanian population
that is most frustrated with the lack of progress associated with passive resistance.
The Kosovars are well aware that they are not able to wage conventional war against
the Serbs. This has resulted in the experimentation with dangerous guerilla tactics in
an effort to achieve their goals.
International mediation could very well be the key to crisis prevention in
Kosovo. The presence of NATO forces in the region may act as a deterrent to ethnic
war. The United States has expressed its commitment to peace in the region as
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indicated through the May 1997 National Security Strategy. Additionally, U.S.
legislators have allocated $6 million in continued financial support for fiscal year
1998. 150 Furthermore, a six-nation contact group that includes the United States,
Russia, Germany, France, Italy, and Britain has pushed for the opening of a dialogue
on Kosovo. 151 An increase in international involvement may serve to close the
expanding communication gap which would ease tensions between Serbs and ethnic
Albanians.
International involvement in Kosovo has the potential to keep the crisis from
worsening, but Serbia appears to remain the key to a successful resolution. Recently,
Serbia has been rocked with political demonstrations that have resulted from a
deteriorating domestic situation. Slobodan Milosevic has successfully maneuvered
himself into the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as it was no longer
constitutional for him to remain President of Serbia. Although he has been successful
in maintaining political control over the FRY, Milosevic's party, the Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS), has received a significant challenge from opposition parties.
At the time of this writing, it appears that the opposition in Serbia is equally
dedicated to Serb nationalism and the current repressive policies toward Kosovo. As
long as Kosovars continue to boycott Serb elections there will be no incentive for Serb
150Kosovo Information Center, "Appropriations Bill for U.S. to provide USD 6
Million for Kosova Next year," No. 1 192, July 24, 1997. Online. Kosovo Daily Report.
August 31, 1997. Available http://www.liri.org/news/balkans/kosova/96-12-
03_l.ksv.html
,51
"Contact Group Expresses Concern on Kosovo," OMRI Daily Digest, RFE/RL.
September 25, 1997.
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politicians to address ethnic Albanian interests. A continuation of the status quo does
not bode well for Kosovo in the future. Pressure continues to build as the
international community insists that the Kosovars seek a solution through a Serbia that
is unwilling to negotiate. Unfortunately, the absence of a mechanism to release this
pressure may prevent a lasting peace in the region.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Unless the international community takes drastic actions in Kosovo, the
outlook for the Balkans is extraordinarily gloomy and the expansion of
war highly probable. 152
The volatile situation between Serbs and ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo has
provided the foundation for a Fourth Balkan War. To date, this unstable situation has not
been addressed by the international community. Incredibly, the 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords did not address the crisis in Kosovo. A lasting peace in the Balkans may be
impossible without resolution of this issue, which served as a catalyst for the most recent
conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
An historical overview has shown that the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated
steadily since the revocation of autonomy by the Milosevic regime in 1989. Belgrade has
repeatedly promised never to surrender control over this region, which is dotted with
Serb monasteries and churches. The Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic, continues to
preside over a campaign of severe repression that has denied the majority of Kosovo's
population their constitutional rights. In the future, Milosevic will most likely take every
precaution to ensure that no concessions are granted that might contradict the policy that
helped him achieve power. It appears that repression will continue regardless of the
regime in Serbia, as Serb nationalism remains an effective platform for the consolidation




resulted in the perilous escalation toward ethnic warfare. The tumultuous history of this
region is indicative of the challenge to security in the future.
This study has examined several scenarios in an attempt to assess the future of
Kosovo. Again, these scenarios included the concept of a greater Albania, an
independent Kosovo, the further federalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a
reestablishment of autonomy, the partitioning of the province, ethnic war, and a
continuation of the status quo. There does not appear to be an agreeable solution to the
conflict as menacing pressure continues to build in an atmosphere already ripe for war.
Clearly, the Kosovars have become increasingly impatient with the torpid
situation and the impending sense ofdoom in Kosovo. President Ibrahim Rugova's
campaign of passive resistance has not improved conditions for ethnic Albanians in the
former autonomous province. The inability of the Democratic League of Kosovo to
bring about required change has resulted in the emergence ofnumerous competing
political organizations. These political organizations are pursuing alternative goals and
demonstrate the high level of discord among ethnic Albanians. Despite numerous
requests by Ibrahim Rugova, many ethnic Albanians have not halted their political
activism when the opposition leadership felt it was inappropriate. An absence of
authority over the restless opposition has exacerbated the already inconstant situation.
Radical activity in Rugova's own party and open disobedience during recent student
demonstrations are evidence of an unhealthy breakdown in the Kosovars' steadfast
commitment to restraint. This is the same Kosovar restraint that former Ambassador
Zimmerman claimed as critical for peace and stability in Kosovo.
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The recent emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) illustrates the
dangerous shift from peaceful resistance to the potential for armed insurrection. This
violent pursuit of political goals through terrorism has reinforced the high level of
distress that Kosovars feel with their everyday life. Although not well-organized at this
time, recent UCK bombings have suggested a certain degree of sophistication in doctrine
and tactics. Furthermore, the UCK's expanded target list and stepped-up activity has
seemingly pushed Kosovo further down the road to regional conflict.
While ethnic Albanians in Kosovo need to understand the Serb attraction to the
region, Serbs must recognize the demographic realities in Kosovo. Kosovo's separate
institutions of government, education, health care, and media outlets have created an
unhealthy separation between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. The Kosovars continue to
refuse participation in elections sponsored by Belgrade and the result has been the
absence of a dialogue considered essential for peace in the region. The international
community may be able to restore this dialogue through contact groups and more
involvement, but both sides must be willing to work for harmonization. In the end, Serb
intransigence, the recent emergence of an armed Kosovar opposition, and the lack of
communication coupled with the absence of international resolve continue to weaken the
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